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Rediscovering Williston
Mark L. Movsesian*
Abstract
This Article is an intellectual history of classical contracts scholar Samuel
Williston. Professor Movsesian argues that the conventional account of
Williston's jurisprudence presents an incomplete and distorted picture.
While much of Williston 's work can strike a contemporary reader as arid
and conceptual, there are strong elements ofpragmatism as well. Williston
insists that doctrine be justified in terms of real-world consequences,
maintains that rules can have only presumptive force, and offers
institutional explanations forjudicial restraint. As a result, his scholarship
shares more in common with today's new formalism than commonly
supposed. Even the undertheorized quality of Williston 's scholarship-to
contemporary readers, the least appealing aspect of his work-makes a
certain amount of sense, given his goals and intended audience.
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I. Introduction
For more than a hundred years now, we have been encountering Samuel
Williston.' Architect of the fundamental concepts of classical contract law,
author of a monumental treatise,2 Reporter on the first Restatement of
Contracts: 3 Williston's impact on American jurisprudence has been enormous
and enduring. In his day, he was by far the most famous American law
professor, regarded both inside and outside the academy as our preeminent
legal scholar. Even many Progressives and Realists who devoted their careers
to debunking Williston's careful doctrinal system treated him with affection
and respect.5 Arthur Corbin referred to Williston as his "older brother" in the
law.6 Karl Llewellyn dedicated a book to Williston as "the maker and builder
of our law of Sales."7 When he died in 1963 at the age of 101, Time magazine
took notice, honoring Williston in an obituary entitled A Yankee Socrates.8
1. Williston's first law review article, a signed student piece, appeared in 1888. Samuel
Williston, Note, The Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused with Other Property, 2
HARV. L. REV. 28 (1888) [hereinafter Williston, Note]. His last, opposing adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code, appeared sixty-two years later. Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales
in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1950) [hereinafter
Williston, Law of Sales].
2. SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920). This treatise is currently in its
fourth edition. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1990).
3. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).
4. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Samuel Williston, 49 A.B.A. J. 362,362
(1963) (noting that "Williston was, by common consent, the greatest law teacher of his time");
Samuel Williston, CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 651,651 (1954) (referring to Williston as "[t]he dean of
the American legal profession").
5. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 25 (1986) ("A first-
generation realist.., treated [Williston] respectfully as [a] brilliant but misguided scholar[].");
see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 289 (1973)
("Williston, whatever his limitations, was admired and liked by those who disagreed with
him.").
6. Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1963).
7. KALMAN, supra note 5, at 25 (internal quotations omitted). Another prominent
Realist, Walter Wheeler Cook, pushed Yale to give Williston an honorary degree. "Let's give
the degree once on the ground of scholarship," Cook advised. Corbin, supra note 6, at 1328
(internal quotations omitted).
8. A Yankee Socrates, TIME, Mar. 1, 1963, at 65. In 1946, Dorothy Canfield Fisher
included Williston in a series of biographical sketches of prominent Americans, along with the
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And his memory lingers on. More than fifty years after his last article and
more than eighty years after his most important work, Williston's name still
appears on lists of the most widely-cited legal scholars. 9 His doctrinal system
remains the basis of our everyday law of contract; his insights provide the
starting point for contemporary academic treatments of central theoretical
issues: the bargain requirement, 1° interpretation and the parol evidence rule,'"
and party autonomy.12 Williston's views on the objective theory of contract are
a staple of the first-year curriculum.' 3 One can safely say that every American
lawyer has read, or at least heard, something about him.
Yet, paradoxically, for the last few decades the academic literature has not
taken Williston's jurisprudence all that seriously. The cite count is high, but
scholars have tended to look to Williston only in passing, referencing him when
they have needed a source for some black-letter proposition or some point of
legal history. In part, this indifference stems from the fact that most of
Williston's work is of a doctrinal and case-oriented style that has fallen out of
vogue. 14  In large part, though, the academy's unwillingness to engage
Williston has reflected the portrait of him left by later Realists like Grant
Gilmore,' 5 whose The Death of Contract famously depicts Williston as a
likes of Dwight Eisenhower, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Robert Frost. DOROTHY CANFIELD FISHER,
AMERICAN PORTRAITS 45 (1946).
9. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Citations, Age, Fame, and the Web, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 333,336 (2000) (including Williston among legal scholars to whom World
Wide Web and Lexis-Nexis searches found the most references); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-
Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409,425 (2000) (including Williston on a list of legal
scholars cited between 1000 and 1500 times in legal and social science articles from 1956 to
1999).
10. See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of
Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1880-82, 1881 n.7 (2001) (stating that Williston and
other classical contract scholars are responsible for the "framework" of "our current
understanding of the [consideration] doctrine").
11. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199-202 (1998)
(discussing Williston's approach to the parol evidence rule).
12. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 58-60
(1995) (discussing Williston's views on freedom of contract).
13. See, e.g., THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 451 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Williston's objective approach); LON
L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 362 (6th ed. 1996) (discussing
the "strict objectivism of classical contract law" as evidenced by Williston); RICHARD E. SPEIDEL
& IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 239 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the objective theory of
contracts).
14. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1321
(2002) (noting that "[t]raditional doctrinal scholarship is disvalued at the leading law schools").
15. See KALMAN, supra note 5, at 25 (stating that later Realists "were less likely to know
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reductive and dreary scribe.' 6 Over time, the conventional wisdom has lumped
Williston together with the great villains of contemporary jurisprudence, the
classical formalists, portraying him as a mindless reactionary obsessed with
logic and conceptual abstraction.17 Even the much-touted "new formalism" of
the 1990s tended to keep its distance from Williston, contrasting its empirical
justifications with the essentialism of the classical model.' 8
In the last couple of years, however, scholars have begun to show a new
respect for Williston's jurisprudence. Some of these scholars reject Gilmore's
characterization and argue that elements of Williston's jurisprudence are both
practical and sophisticated. For example, in an article in the Yale Law Journal,
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott attempt to restore a "Willistonian" approach to
the interpretation of certain contracts between firms. 19 In the absence of
externalities, they argue, Willistonian formalism best suits the profit-
Williston ... and more prone to attack [him] with great vigor"). On Gilmore's characterization
as a Realist, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Remembering Grant Gilmore, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 67, 71
(2002) (stating that Gilmore is rightly seen as a practitioner of Legal Realism).
16. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974) [hereinafter GILMORE,
DEATH OF CONTRACT] (stating that Williston "pieced together" the general theory of contract law
"in meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail"); see also Charles M. Yablon,
Grant Gilmore, Holmes, and the Anxiety of Influence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 236, 239 (1995)
(discussing Gilmore's depiction of Williston). Gilmore had a mixed view of Williston. While
Gilmore sometimes depicts Williston as "a plodding scrivener," Braucher, supra note 12, at 58,
he also pays credit to Williston's ingenuity and technical expertise. See GILMORE, DEATH OF
CONTRACT, supra, at 43 (alluding to Williston's "very considerable ingenuity"); id. at 59
(arguing that Williston and Corbin's "joint participation... insured the extraordinarily high
technical quality" of the Restatement of Contracts); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 134 n. 12 (1977) [hereinafter GILMORE, AGES] (praising Williston as "the most
ingenious system-builder in the history of our jurisprudence").
17. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 543 (1973) (stating
that Williston's treatise "was, from the standpoint of legal or social thought, volume after
volume of a heavy void"); id. at 593 (arguing that Williston's treatise lacked "any ethical,
economic, or social notions whatsoever"); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 201 (1977) (arguing that Williston's formalism "disguise[d]
gross disparities of bargaining power"); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 798 (2002) (arguing that Williston's
"mindset" exemplified classical contract law's disinterest in real-world effects); Stephen A.
Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV.
1513, 1591 (2001) (stating that Williston's "writings are wholly bereft of policy discussion").
18. See David Chamy, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842-43
(1999) (distinguishing between "essentialist" formalism of the classical period and
contemporary formalism); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 607,619
(1999) (distinguishing between modem and classical formalism); Robert E. Scott, The Case For
Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 851 n. 11, 874 (2000) (distinguishing
between old and new formalism).
19. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 549 (2003).
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maximizing goals of commercial parties; as a result, his approach can serve as
the foundation for a new "law merchant for our time., 20 Similarly, Todd
Rakoff argues that Williston's work on contract interpretation "contains writing
of considerable subtlety" that should "be treated as a legitimate part of the
modem conversation.' 1 Some scholars actually embrace the conceptualism
with which critics have charged Williston. For example, Peter Benson recently
has set out to complete what he perceives to be Williston's central project-
presenting a coherent, autonomous account of contract law that relies solely on
the unifying principles implicit in legal doctrine.22
What accounts for this renewed interest in Williston's jurisprudence? Part
of the explanation lies in the cyclical nature of legal scholarship. 3 American
contract law tends to fluctuate between formalist and nonformalist periods, and
we live in something of a formalist moment.24 In contrast to the scholarship of
a generation or two ago, today's cutting-edge work in contracts values bright-
line rules, objective interpretation, and freedom of contract. These were central
themes of classical formalism as well, and it is only natural that, whatever their
initial misgivings, today's new formalists should seek to learn more about the
views of their academic ancestors.
In addition, there is a growing disquiet in the academy about the promise
of contract theory. While the fundamental doctrines of contract law are not
controversial, little agreement exists on their theoretical justification.25
Numerous contenders have appeared-autonomy theories, consent theories,
efficiency theories, pluralist theories, relational theories, and others-but no
one theory has seemed capable of providing a satisfactory comprehensive
account. 26 Even the most influential of these explanations, the law-and-
20. Id. at 550.
21. Todd D. Rakoff, Introduction to Symposium: Law, Knowledge, and the Academy,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1283 (2002).
22. Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118,
123-27 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
23. See GILMORE, AGES, supra note 16, at 18 (noting "periodic swings toward and away
from formalism" in "academic legal literature").
24. See Charny, supra note 18, at 842 (stating that contemporary commercial law is in a
"phase of 'anti-antiformalism"'); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1995) (arguing that contemporary contract law is
"retreat[ing]" to the formalism of classical contract law).
25. See Benson, supra note 22, at 118 ("[T]he definitions of and mutual connections
between the various principles of contract law are for the most part well-settled and no longer
subject to controversy .... The same cannot be said, however, of efforts to understand the law at
a reflective level.").
26. See id. (discussing the "multiplicity of competing theoretical approaches"). For
excellent accounts of the various theories, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,
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economics model, may now have reached a point of diminishing marginal
returns.27 In light of this impasse, Williston's doctrinal scholarship, long
ignored, seems worthy of a second look.
Finally, recent years have seen a surge of interest in classical jurisprudence
generally.28 There exists an important and growing collection of intellectual
29histories of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century legal thinkers. Much
of this scholarship seeks to correct misconceptions about classicism, restoring
subtleties that conventional depictions have suppressed.30 For example,
Burlette Carter, Bruce Kimball, William LaPiana, and Tony Sebok all offer
new accounts of C.C. Langdell that highlight what the authors believe to be
overlooked complexities in Langdell's work.31 Stephen Feldman explains
apparent tensions in classicism through the framework of Aristotelian
86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986); Peter Benson, Introduction, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW 1, 4-18 (2001).
27. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 829-30 (2003) (suggesting "skepticism about how
much additional value economics has to offer to understanding contract law today").
28. For examples of works discussing classical jurisprudence, see generally NEIL
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9-64 (1995); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998); Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and
Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 473, 497-507 (2003); Steve Sheppard,
Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture
Hall, 82 IOWA L. REv. 547, 596-619 (1997); Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of
American Foreign Policy: From the GildedAge to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 239,247-
84 (2003); Forum: Once More Unto the Breach: Late Nineteenth-Century Jurisprudence
Revisited, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 541 (2002); Forum: That Impecunious Introvert From New
Hampshire: Re-Imagining Langdell, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 (1999).
29. For examples, see Paul D. Carrington, Law as "The Common Thoughts ofMen ": The
Law-Teaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L. REV. 495 (1997); Lewis
A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 577
(2002); Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 215 (1995).
30. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century
American Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 541,541-42 (2003) (stating that "the
late nineteenth-century scholars formed a ... sophisticated American school of historical
jurisprudence that merits further study"); id. at 546 (explaining that "the nineteenth-century
scholars were much more sophisticated and complex than portrayed by the summary, and
sometimes condescending, comments of their successors").
31. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 169 (1994) ("Langdell was neither
intellectually perverse nor unimaginative, nor stupid."); ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM
IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 83-97 (1998) (rejecting the argument that Langdell "embraced
transcendentalism"); W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 136 (1997)
(rejecting the view that Langdell was "an inflexible formalist"); Bruce A. Kimball, "Warn
Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They Are Not to Take as Law": The
Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883,
17 LAW & HIST. REv. 57, 60-61 (1999) (arguing that certain "newly examined writings... call
for a reconsideration of the conventional judgment about [Langdell's] intellectual work").
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philosophy and maintains that Langdellians, in their rejection of natural-law
explanations for legal rules, were America's first modernists.32 And, using the
work of John Chipman Gray as an example, Stephen Siegel argues that,
conventional critiques notwithstanding, most classical legal scholarship had a
firm grounding in social norms.33
The time is thus ripe for a rediscovery of Williston, for a thorough
reexamination of his work. When one takes the time to read Williston, one sees
that the conventional account presents an incomplete and distorted picture of
his jurisprudence.34 Although much of his work can strike a contemporary
reader as arid and conceptual, there are strong elements of pragmatism as well.
Williston tempers his emphasis on formal logic with a concern for the real-
world effect of legal rules, his advocacy of economic individualism with a
recognition of the need for some market regulation. Williston's work has more
balance and nuance, and shows more continuity with contemporary contracts
scholarship, than we commonly suppose.
For example, Williston is a formalist. He stresses the importance of
coherent general principles, clear rules, and logical analysis. 35  But his
jurisprudence is not essentialist. He does not argue that a proper metaphysical
conception of contract requires formalism; indeed, a distrust for abstract
speculation is a strong theme in his work.36 Rather, Williston advocates
formalism on pragmatic grounds. For him, formalism's appeal lies in the fact
that it promotes the important everyday benefits of simplicity, predictability,
32. See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The
Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1434-38 (1997) (drawing an analogy between
Aristotelian philosophy and Langdellian jurisprudence); id. at 1393 ("Langdellian legal
scientists repudiated this premodern faith [in natural law principles] and instead began the
characteristically modernist quest for an Archimedean point, a new ground for legal
knowledge."); id. at 1441 (referring to Langdellians as "the first modernist American
jurisprudents").
33. See Siegel, supra note 17, at 1516-18 (stating that most classical scholars thought that
law properly reflected social mores).
34. See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Equitable Administration of Long-Term Relations: An
Appreciation of Judge Clark's Opinion in Parev Products, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK
45, 48 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991) (noting that "[t]he story the neoclassicists told of...
Williston was often mistaken").
35. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 213-14 (1941) (arguing for "broad[]
generalizations and syntheses" as well as logical coherence in law).
36. See, e.g., id. at 203 (discussing the danger posed by abstract inquiry in law); id. at 207
("[Law] is a practical profession and must be carried on by lawyers... rather ... than
metaphysicians."); SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 127-28 (photo.
reprint 1986) (1929) (stating that law is a "pragmatic science" that "can rarely deal with the
absolute").
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and comprehensibility. 37  Moreover, Williston understands that practical
concerns may require courts to forgo formalism on occasion. Although he is
reluctant to depart too quickly from logic, Williston recognizes that legal rules
can have only presumptive effect and that they must sometimes take a back seat
to what he calls "practical convenience. 38 "[L]aw is made for man," he chides,
"not man for the law."'39
Similarly, the conventional portrayal of Williston as a reactionary is
simplistic. 40 Though he is an economic individualist-in his autobiography,
Williston writes that he formed his political beliefs on the philosophy of
Benjamin Franklin, the person he considers "the most interesting American"-
he is not doctrinaire about it.41 Williston criticizes other formalists for refusing
to acknowledge that legal rules must evolve in light of changing social
conditions,42 and he himself occasionally espouses positions that are "mildly
liberal" in early twentieth-century terms.43  For example, in his statutory
drafting, he rejects what he considers to be "the more obviously barbarous
applications" of caveat emptor.44 Similarly, in an article titled Freedom of
Contract, Williston criticizes the Lochner Court for endorsing an extreme
version of liberty of contract and for refusing to uphold reasonable public
37. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 213; see Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U.S.
L. REV. 237, 239-40 (1935) (arguing that law must be clear, predictable, and logically
coherent).
38. 3 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1321, at 2373 ("It may be conceded that practical
convenience is of more importance than logical exactness, but yet the considerations of practical
convenience must be very weighty."); Samuel Williston, Book Review, 35 HARV. L. REV. 220,
221 (1921) [hereinafter Williston, Book Review] (reviewing SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT (9th ed. 192 1)) ("No one will dispute that logic should be the servant
not the master of practical convenience.").
39. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 119, at 256.
40. See Allen D. Boyer, Samuel Williston s Struggle With Depression, 42 BUFF. L. REV. I,
23 (1994) (noting that "[tlhere is ... little which is reactionary about [Williston's] philosophy").
41. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 323; see also id. at 335 (discussing his belief in "the
theories of Emerson and Franklin"). Williston claimed to read "every new biography of
[Franklin] and also much that he wrote." Id. at 323. For more on Williston's economic
individualism, see Samuel Williston, The Law School, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., July 1948, at 5
(discussing the political economy of the Harvard Law faculty in the 1890s).
42. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 200.
43. Harold C. Havighurst, Book Review, 48 YALE L.J. 352, 354 (1938) (reviewing
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1936)); see also Edwin W.
Patterson, Book Review, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 908, 908 (1930) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON,
SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW (1929)) (stating that Williston's "present" views are
"liberal" in twentieth-century terms). Williston, wrote Havighurst, "is a conservative only in the
sense in which Holmes was a liberal." Havighurst, supra, at 354.
44. Samuel Williston, Rescission For Breach of Warranty, 16 HARV. L. REV. 465, 475
(1903).
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health regulations and other Progressive legislation.4 s Williston does not
oppose reform in itself; he simply believes that legislatures, not courts, should
bear responsibility for social change. One can thus explain Williston's
conservatism as principally an institutional point-compared to legislatures,
courts lack the information and expertise necessary to engage in beneficial
social experimentation.4 6
In his insistence that law be justified on the basis of real-world effects, his
rejection of metaphysics, his belief that rules can have only presumptive force,
and his institutional explanations for judicial restraint, Williston shares much in
common with today's new formalists-more than the conventional account
would lead us to suppose.47 Although Williston differs on the value of
systematic jurisprudence and the determinacy of doctrine, he shares with
contemporary scholars the conviction that one must ultimately defend law, not
in terms of internal coherence, but in terms of conformity to beneficial social
policy. In his fundamentally pragmatic approach, Williston resembles the new
formalists more than he does classicists like Langdell and their relatively few
modem counterparts.48
In one important respect, though, the conventional account portrays
Williston correctly. Williston's jurisprudence strikes a contemporary academic
reader as greatly undertheorized. Much of his writing-his treatment of
contract remedies, which Fuller and Perdue famously critiqued, is a notable
example-simply details the workings of black-letter rules; policyjustifications
are nowhere to be found.49 Moreover, when Williston does make policy
arguments, he tends to limit himself to shorthand references, pointing out that a
rule does or does not comport with undefined notions of "inherent justice 00 or
45. Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 375-77 (1921).
46. For a similar point by a contemporary law-and-economics scholar, see MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 248-50 (1993) (discussing the reasons why
courts in contract cases lack the capacity to address larger societal issues).
47. For thoughtful pieces distinguishing the new formalism from classical formalism, see
Grey, supra note 28, at 499; Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 28, at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=200732 (Sept. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Grey, New
Formalism] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Grey, New Formalism, supra note 47, at 28 (contrasting the essentialism of
classical formalism with the pragmatism of the newer version).
49. See Benson, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing Fuller and Perdue's critique of Williston's
treatment of the expectation interest).
50. See, e.g., 3 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1510, at 2686 (explaining the "inherent
justice" of liability for honest misrepresentation); Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts Since
the Restatement, 23 A.B.A. J. 172, 172 (1937) (discussing the "unjust conclusion" that courts
properly have tried to avoid in cases regarding the revocation of offers).
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"practical convenience."' These vague allusions can strike a contemporary
academic reader as unsatisfying, even banal.52
The lack of delineation makes a certain amount of sense, however, once
one appreciates Williston's goals and intended audience. Unlike today's
academics, who write principally for the community of other scholars, Williston
directs his work primarily towards commercial lawyers and their clients.53 Such
people, who must understand law on an operational level, have relatively little
interest in theoretical accounts. 54 They want a comprehensible, predictable set
of rules by which to plan their transactions, and they are much more
comfortable than scholars with common-sense appeals to rough justice; they
rely on such intuitive judgments all the time. 55 Indeed, more complicated
explanations of law's effects, or more controversial accounts of law's
justifications, can create obstacles for people in business. As Richard Posner
argues, everyday commerce depends on the ability of parties to displace debates
about "deep issues" that have little practical payoff and that can "disrupt and
even poison commercial relations among strangers.
56
Indeed, Williston's jurisprudence has some surprising affinities with what
Posner calls "everyday pragmatism" in law. 57 Although this approach does not
deny the possibility of richer explanations of law-as discussed below,
Williston has some good things to say about sociological jurisprudence and the
law-in-action school, the predecessors of today's empirical jurisprudence-it
treats them as basically beside the point.58 It views contract law principally as a
rough-and-ready device to help practical people achieve their commercial goals
with elementary justice.5 9 This approach cannot satisfy all intellectual
51. See, e.g., 3 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 1307, at 2357 (discussing "claims of practical
convenience" regarding doctrine of anticipatory breach); Samuel Williston, Liability For Honest
Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REv. 415, 436 (1911) (rejecting the argument that "practical
convenience" requires treating misrepresentation as part of negligence law).
52. Cf Posner, supra note 27, at 831 (arguing that, from the perspective of contemporary
scholarship, the economic insights of earlier scholars "seem banal").
53. Cf Posner, supra note 14, at 1320-21, 1324 (explaining that earlier legal scholarship
was directed at judges and lawyers, while contemporary legal scholarship is intended to be read
primarily by other professors).
54. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw,' PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 41 (2003) (arguing
that certain legal theory "has little to contribute to law at the operational level").
55. See Posner, supra note 14, at 1319 (noting tendency of lawyers and judges to "toss
around" ideas like "'fairness' and 'justice' ... as if they were perfectly intuitive").
56. POSNER, supra note 54, at 12.
57. Id. at 49.
58. See infra notes 426-43 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's views on
sociological jurisprudence and law-in-action).
59. See POSNER, supra note 54, at 49-56 (discussing everyday pragmatism).
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ambitions about law; indeed, intellectual modesty is one of its hallmarks. 60 But
it does have the benefit of conforming to the perceptions most Americans have
about the proper ends of the legal system.6' Indeed, the everyday pragmatism
of Williston's jurisprudence reflects some of the most identifiable and enduring
American values-the values of that "most interesting American," Benjamin
Franklin 62-individualism, practicality, and common sense. In rediscovering
Williston, we rediscover some of the most fundamental assumptions of our
commercial republic.63
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins with a brief survey of
Williston's career and then shows how, in the conventional account, Williston's
work differs from today's contracts scholarship. Part In restores a more correct
and balanced version of Williston's jurisprudence. It explores Williston's
rejection of essentialism, his belief in the presumptive nature of legal rules, and
his moderate and institutional approach to freedom of contract. It also
discusses the undertheorized quality of much of Williston's scholarship and
argues that Williston's reliance on intuitive justifications for legal rules makes
sense in light of his goals and intended audience. Throughout, Part In
addresses a variety of problems in contract theory that continue to inspire
heated debate today: the bargain requirement and promissory estoppel, the
objective theory of interpretation, the proper scope of party autonomy, and the
value of empirical research.
II. Williston and the New Formalism
A. Williston's Career
Samuel Williston arrived at Harvard Law School as a first-year student in
the fall of 1885, and, with a few brief interruptions, he remained there for the
rest of his long career. 4 .The case-study method that Dean C.C. Langdell had
introduced at Harvard was still controversial in 1885; indeed, Williston had
hesitated to go to Harvard because he feared that his education there would be
too impractical.65 Whatever his initial reservations, though, Williston thrived at
60. Id. at 49-50.
61. Id. at 50.
62. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 323.
63. See POSNER, supra note 54, at 11-12, 49-50 (discussing the values of everyday
pragmatism).
64. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 71.
65. Id.
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Harvard. He became a member of the first board of editors of the HarvardLaw
Review and earned extraordinarily high grades, graduating at the top of his class
in 1888.66 After graduation, in a pattern that would become standard for
aspiring law professors, Williston spent a year as a law clerk to Supreme Court
Justice Horace Gray and did a short stint as an attorney in a Boston firm.67 He
returned to Harvard to join the faculty as an assistant professor in the fall of
1890 at the age of twenty-nine. 8
For the next sixty years, Williston actively pursued a life of teaching,
scholarship, and occasional practice. Like many law professors, Williston
developed his specialty more or less by accident. Two first-year courses were
open at Harvard in the fall of 1890, torts and contracts, and a senior colleague
chose torts.69 Williston quickly developed a reputation as one of the ablest and
most engaging teachers on the Harvard faculty, a reputation he kept throughout
his career. 70 Though his method was Socratic, he was by all accounts genuinely
respectful of students, avoiding histrionics and cheap appeals to authority.
71
Indeed, a concern for students features strongly in his jurisprudence. As I
discuss further below, Williston favored formalism in part because of what he
saw as its pedagogical advantages.
72
Still, Williston's impact on American law primarily came, not through his
teaching, but through his scholarship and statutory drafting. The length of his
academic career alone is staggering. His first piece as a professor, a treatment
of a bankruptcy question, appeared in 1891 ;73 his last, an article opposing the
66. Id. at 83, 87; see also Austin Wakeman Scott, Book Review, 54 HARV. L. REV. 352,
353 (1940) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW (1940)) (discussing Williston's class
rank at Harvard Law School); Bruce Wyman, Samuel Williston, Professor of Law, 23 GREEN
BAG 613, 613 (1911) (discussing Williston's student days at Harvard Law School).
67. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 87-101 (discussing his clerkship); id. at 107-28
(discussing his time as an attorney).
68. Wyman, supra note 66, at 614. Williston was appointed an assistant professor
without the customary probationary period as instructor. Id.
69. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 132.
70. For examples of the numerous tributes to Williston's teaching ability, see ARTHUR E.
SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 201, 216-17, 221 (1967), and Felix Frankfurter, Samuel
Williston: An Inadequate Tribute to a Beloved Teacher, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1322-23
(1963).
71. See Scott, supra note 66, at 352 (discussing Williston's teaching methods).
72. See KALMAN, supra note 5, at 46-47 (noting that Williston favored formalism because
it "taught students to think clearly and logically").
73. Samuel Williston, Can An Insolvent Debtor Insure His Life for the Benefit of His
Wife, 25 AM. L. REV. 185 (1891). Williston wrote two pieces as a student: Williston, Note,
supra note 1, and Samuel Williston, Note, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800 (pts. I & 2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
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UCC, appeared in 1950 when Williston was eighty-eight years old.74 All told,
Williston wrote more than fifty articles covering the fundamental doctrines of
contract law, including offer and acceptance, consideration, interpretation,
defenses, and remedies.75 In addition, he wrote or edited eighteen casebooks
and produced several treatises on commercial law subjects like bankruptcy and
negotiable instruments.76 Two of these treatises, the 1909 work on sales77 and
the monumental 1920 work on contracts,78 brought him particular acclaim. The
five-volume contracts treatise was especially influential and quickly became a
standard source both in the courts and the academy.79
Williston's activities as a statutory drafter also had great influence. Along
with others at the turn of the twentieth century, Williston perceived that the
diversity of state commercial laws posed an impediment to national economic
development.80 He was unwilling to assign a general regulatory power to the
federal government, though.8 1 Rather than create a new "bureaucracy" in
Washington, Williston argued that lawyers should convince state governments
to adopt uniform legislation on commercial subjects, 2 and he devoted a great
deal of his career to drafting and lobbying for such laws. 3 He turned out to be
extremely able at it, producing model statutes on sales, warehouse receipts, bills
of lading, and stock certificates.8 4 Even his harsh critic Grant Gilmore
74. Williston, Law of Sales, supra note 1; see also Erwin N. Griswold, Samuel
Williston-1861-1963, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1325 (1963). Williston was still regularly
working in his office at age ninety. Professor Williston Feted By Faculty; Spends Ninetieth
Birthday At His Desk, THE HARV. L. SCH. RECORD, Oct. 3, 1951, at I.
75. Melvin I. Urofsky, Entry on Samuel Williston, DICT. AM. Bio. 791, 792 (John A.
Garraty ed., Supp. 7, 1961-1965); see also HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN HONOR OF,
AND PRESENTED TO JOSEPH HENRY BEALE AND SAMUEL WILLISTON 548-51 (1934) (listing
Williston's articles).
76. Urofksky, supra note 75, at 792.
77. SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES AcT (1909).
78. WILLISTON, supra note 2.
79. Urofsky, supra note 75, at 792.
80. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 217 (arguing that varying state commercial rules
caused "expense" and "annoyance"); see also WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 74-75 (arguing that
"interference with business by differences of law in the several States is a matter of serious
importance").
81. "[U]nless the entire framework of our government is changed," he believed, "most of
what is known as private law must remain the separate law of each individual state."
WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 217. Williston did help draft a federal statute on bills of lading in
interstate commerce, known as the Pomerene Act after its Senate sponsor. Id. at 225.
82. Id. at217-18.
83. Id. at217-29.
84. Urofsky, supra note 75, at 792.
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conceded that Williston was "one of the best statutory draftsmen... ever." 5
By one estimate, at least thirty-six states adopted statutes that Williston had
86written.
Williston's work as Reporter on the influential Restatement of Contracts is
well known. The American Law Institute (ALI) began compiling its
restatements of the law in the early 1920s, and Williston, fresh off his work on
the contracts treatise, was an enthusiastic participant in the project.8 7 Williston
believed that American case law had become dangerously complex and difficult
for lawyers to research; the Restatement could help ameliorate the problem by
setting forth the rules in a simple and comprehensive way. 8 The Restatement
project drew sharp criticism from Realist critics who derided what they saw as
the project's conceptualism and bias against reform. 89 For Williston, though,
the Restatement's appeal lay precisely in its moderation. Less rigid than a
legislative code, the Restatement could both harmonize conflicting precedents
and allow room for future growth in the law.90 It is worthwhile to note that
Williston chose the Progressive Arthur Corbin as his assistant on the project9'
and that, the conventional wisdom notwithstanding, Williston championed the
Restatement's major innovation in contract law, Section 90's version of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.92
85. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 16, at 134 n.12.
86. Urofsky, supra note 75, at 792.
87. See TWINING, supra note 5, at 273-74 (describing the genesis of the Restatement
project); WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 310-11 (same).
88. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 309-11 (discussing Restatement project).
89. See, e.g., GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 16, at 58-59 (arguing that "the
Restatement project" was "a reaction of the legal establishment of the time to the attack of the
so-called legal realists"); WIECEK, supra note 28, at 199 (discussing Realist objections to the
Restatement project).
90. See WILISTON, supra note 36, at 94-95, 99, 104-05 (discussing the purposes and
goals of the Restatement).
91. TWINING, supra note 5, at 397 n.31; see also Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price
Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 519-21
(1990) (explaining the reasons for Williston's choice of Corbin).
92. Cf ROBERTA. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 45-47 (1997) (discussing
Williston's role in the debates surrounding Section 90's adoption). For more on Williston and
promissory estoppel, see infra text accompanying notes 269-99.
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B. Williston and the New Formalism
For most of his career, Williston received nearly universal recognition as
America's preeminent contracts scholar. Lawyers and academics repeatedly
described his work as authoritative, even "epochal.0 3 Even Progressives and
some early Realists went out of their way to praise Williston's erudition and
intellectual honesty.94 For example, in his review of the 1920 contracts treatise,
Arthur Corbin applauded the fact that Williston had refused to "dodge the hard
questions or gloss them over with specious distinctions. We may differ with
him in his conclusions occasionally, but it will never be because he has failed to
present the facts and the arguments with intellectual honesty."9 5 Realist Walter
Wheeler Cook acknowledged the immense undertaking that the treatise
represented and praised Williston's "patience," "thoroughness," and "sanity."
96
93. Herman W. Oliphant, Book Review, 19 MICH. L. REV. 358, 360 (1921) (reviewing
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)).
94. To be sure, some Realist critics did allege that Williston was too quick to dismiss as
aberrations cases that did not fit within his doctrinal scheme. For example, Cook famously
argued that Williston failed to pay sufficient attention to cases holding that the mailbox rule did
not apply to life insurance policies. Walter Wheeler Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L.
REV. 497,511-15 (1939) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1936-1938)); see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv.
1, 46 & n. 169 (1983) (discussing Cook's critique); Lon L. Fuller, Williston on Contracts, 18
N.C. L. REV. 1,3-5 (1939) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1936-1938)) (arguing that Williston "rejected as freaks far too many cases which
are really significant"). But these critics did not accuse Williston of dishonesty; they alleged,
simply, that in certain instances Williston placed too much emphasis on doctrinal certainty at the
expense of evolving caselaw. See Cook, supra, at 514 (stating that Williston failed to recognize
"the complexity of the law of contracts"); Fuller, supra, at 5 (arguing that the failure to consider
cases "which do not fit into its systematics" is the "most serious defect" in Williston's contracts
treatise). For more on Williston's willingness to accept doctrinal change, see infra notes 310-
32 and accompanying text.
95. Arthur L. Corbin, Book Review, 29 YALE L.J. 942, 942 (1920) (reviewing SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)).
96. Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 395,398 (1921) (reviewing
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)). Interestingly, in light of what was to
become one of the principal charges against him, both Corbin and Cook faulted Williston's
treatise for being insufficiently analytical. Both believed that the treatise would have been
improved by a more rigorous application of Hohfeldian terminology-a more careful
distinguishing "between facts and their legal consequences, between the different meanings
given to the word right, etc." Id.; see also Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 716,716 (1920) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)); Corbin,
supra note 95, at 942. Another Realist, Herman Oliphant, had a similar critique. Oliphant,
supra note 93, at 358 (arguing that "the value of the book would have been added to if, by a
judicious use of more incisive terminology, sharper distinctions had been made"). For more on
Williston's views of Hohfeldian analysis, see infra notes 418-25 and accompanying text.
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Karl Llewellyn dedicated a casebook to Williston as "the maker and builder of
our law of Sales.
9 7
But Williston lived a long time, long enough to see his reputation start to
decline. As the twentieth century progressed, critics began to paint a much
more negative picture of Williston and his scholarship. In part, the change can
be explained by the fact that fewer of the critics actually knew him. As Laura
Kalman points out, later Realists who never had a personal relationship with
Williston were more prone to attack him.98 But more than lack of acquaintance
explains the changing treatment. The Realists became increasingly scathing in
their denunciations of classical formalism as years passed, and Williston, who
had written the most important contracts treatise and had worked as Reporter on
the Restatement, served as a convenient target. The Realists' intellectual heirs
picked up the charge, 99 and over time the critiques have hardened into a
conventional wisdom about Williston. The academy has come to view
Williston as more or less interchangeable with Langdell and other classicists,
and, as such, qualitatively different from today's new formalists. 100
The conventional wisdom holds that Williston differs from the new
formalists in four important and related ways. First, Williston allegedly takes
an essentialist view of contract law. That is, Williston joins other classicists in
believing that "contract" is, philosophically speaking, a concept with an
essence, an irreducible descriptive and normative core. 10' Under this view,
contract law consists of a set of axioms that follow from a true understanding of
that essence and a set of rules that follow from the axioms. 0 2 Some writers
97. KALMAN, supra note 5, at 25 (internal quotations omitted).
98. Id.
99. See Joseph Perillo, Samuel Williston, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW
839 (2002) (discussing how "[m]embers of the critical legal studies movement demonized"
Williston in the 1960s and 1970s).
100. As one commentator has observed, "[m]uch of Williston's reputation ... involves the
attribution of guilt by association." Boyer, supra note 40, at 3. For recent examples of the
tendency to equate Williston and Langdell, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal
Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 661,666 (1998) (characterizing Williston
as "very Langdellian"); Grey, supra note 28, at 501 (arguing that Williston was "Langdellian in
approach"); and Knapp, supra note 17, at 766, 798 (stating that Williston and Langdell both
exemplified classical contract analysis).
101. See Chamy, supra note 18, at 842 (discussing the essentialism of classical contract
law); Grey, supra note 94, at 48-49 (same).
102. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743, 1751 (2000) (arguing that classicists "conceived contract law as a small set of core
doctrines-axioms-that were justified on the ground that they were self-evident, and as a
larger set of doctrines that werejustified largely on the ground that they could be deduced from
the axioms").
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portray Williston's essentialism as Platonic, as positing the real existence of the
concept of contract in some independent realm of abstract forms.' °3 Others
portray Williston's essentialism as more Aristotelian, as holding that the
concept of contract does not have an independent existence but somehow
inheres in real-world transactions. 104 Either way, the key point is that contract
law draws its justification from its conformity with a proper understanding of
contract as a concept, without regard to the practical effect contract law has in
terms of efficiency or other values. 05
To make this discussion more concrete, consider the most famous example
of essentialism in classical contract law, an example that comes, not from
Williston, but from Langdell.10 6  Under the familiar "mailbox rule," an
acceptance of an offer made by correspondence is effective immediately upon
dispatch-at the moment the offeree puts the acceptance out of his or her
control-even if the offeror has not yet received it.'0 7 Langdell rejected this
rule.108 To him, the essence of contract lay in the concept of promise, and the
essence of promise lay in communication to the promisee.'09 A promise that
the promisee had not received was, by definition, not a promise at all; thus, an
acceptance could take effect only upon receipt by the offeror." ° Langdell
recognized that there might be practical arguments for the mailbox rule. He
noted that judges had "claimed that purposes of substantial justice, and the
interests of contracting parties as understood by themselves, [would] be best
served by holding that the contract is complete the moment the letter of
103. See Knapp, supra note 17, at 798 (suggesting that Williston believed that "judicially-
created 'law' ... descend[s] from some Platonic realm of disinterested abstraction").
104. See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1435-38 (discussing analogies between classical legal
scholarship and Aristotelian philosophy). For more on Aristotelian philosophy and its
application to private law, see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 19,56-83(1995);
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949,
977-85 (1988).
105. See Eisenberg, supra note 102, at 1750 (explaining that classical contract law
maintained that fundamental doctrines were self-evident and allowed "no room" for "justifying
doctrinal propositions on the basis of moral and policy propositions").
106. For good discussions of this example, see id. at 1750, 1751; Grey, supra note 94, at
3-4.
107. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.22 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing "[c]ontracts
by [c]orrespondence").
108. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 15 (2d ed. 1880)
(arguing that "[tlhe acceptance ... must be communicated to the original offerer, and until such
communication the contract is not made").
109. See id. (arguing that "communication to the offeree is of the essence of every offer").
110. See Grey, supra note 94, at 4 (discussing Langdell's views regarding the mailbox
rule).
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acceptance is mailed," and that some had posed cases showing that Langdell's
approach "would produce not only unjust but absurd results.""' For an
essentialist like Langdell, though, these practical arguments were
"irrelevant. " 1 12 Once one understood the true nature of a promise, nothing else
could matter.
A few formalists today, most notably Benson and Weinrib, continue to
embrace a kind of essentialism in contract law.' But most new formalists
reject essentialism. They advocate formalism, not because it coheres with
abstract concepts like "contract" and "promise," but because it advances
important pragmatic values like certainty, stability, and efficiency. 114 For
example, Lisa Bernstein writes that formalist adjudication by private arbitral
regimes benefits contracting parties by promoting clarity and predictability.'I"
A comprehensive set of bright-line rules, she argues, reduces transaction costs
and makes misunderstandings less likely.116 Moreover, if disputes do arise, a
formalist approach improves the chances of settlement "by making arbitral
outcomes relatively predictable."" 7 Similarly, Schwartz and Scott advocate
formalist interpretation of certain business contracts, at least as a default
position, as a means of promoting efficiency. 18 They believe that a plain-
meaning approach, coupled with a "hard" version of the parol evidence rule and
strict enforcement of merger clauses, best suits the presumed goals of
contracting parties-maximizing the joint gains from transactions." 9
Second, Williston allegedly shares the classicists' belief in the
ineluctability of legal rules. Classicism taught that judges should apply
common law doctrines with relentless logic, without allowing for any
111. LANGDELL, supra note 108, at 20-21.
112. Id. at 21. Langdell did go on to demonstrate that, assuming practical arguments were
relevant, he could muster some in favor of his own position. Id.
113. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78
CH.-KENr L. REv. 55, 70-93 (2003) (discussing punitive damages and disgorgement of gains in
terms of corrective justice). See generally Benson, supra note 22, at 123-25 (describing a
"public and non-foundational" approach to contract law).
114. See Grey, New Formalism, supra note 47, at 4, 28-29 (discussing the pragmatic
nature of the new formalism).
115. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1735-44 (2001)
(describing and discussing advantages of formalist approach of cotton industry arbitration
tribunals).
116. Id. at 1741-42.
117. Id. at 1742.
118. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 547.
119. Id.; see also id. at 544-46 (discussing the authors' "efficiency theory").
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exceptions based upon new social propositions or the harshness of particular
results. 120 For example, classical contract law held that promises unsupported
by consideration-gift promises-were unenforceable. 2 1 As a result, a court
should not enforce a gift promise even in circumstances where the promisee
reasonably had relied on the promise to his detriment. 122 People might recoil at
the idea that a promisee would have to bear the loss in these circumstances, but
a court could not ignore the rule about gift promises simply because the rule led
to a harsh or unfair result.123 Just as classicists denied the role of real-world
concerns in the formulation of legal rules, they denied the role of real-world
concerns in the application of rules as well.
By contrast, the new formalists believe that legal rules have merely
presumptive force. 124 They argue that when pragmatic or ethical considerations
counsel strongly against the application of a rule in a particular case, a court
should not insist on applying the rule.125 For example, Frederick Schauer
endorses a "new" version of formalism that he calls "presumptive
positivism., 16 Under this approach, legal rules create "presumptive rather than
absolute" constraints for courts, "thereby... allowing for the possibility of
override in particularly exigent circumstances."'127 Similarly, Randy Barnett's
"consent theory" of contract relies heavily on presumptions in explaining the
proper limits of objective interpretation and the role of contract defenses.1
2 1
120. Eisenberg, supra note 102, at 1752-53 (criticizing this aspect of classical legal
reasoning).
121. 1 draw this example from Eisenberg. See id. (discussing "donative promises").
122. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, § 2.19, at 91 (discussing the traditional rule).
123. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on
Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 846 (1990) (noting that the traditional rule "ignored the
promisor's role in inducing reliance and unjustifiably allowed promisors to avoid responsibility
for consequences that they knew were likely to result from their actions").
124. See Grey, supra note 28, at 499 (discussing the "presumptive" nature of contemporary
formalism).
125. See id. (noting that Justice Scalia "admits to being a 'faint-hearted' (meaning only
presumptive) formalist overall: Considerations of acceptability can override all the formal
virtues when their demands are insistent enough"); see also Grey, New Formalism, supra note
47, at 4 (discussing how Scalia's writings indicate that "rule-of-law virtues.., have only
presumptive controlling force on judges"); id. at 23 (discussing how, for new formalists,
principles serve as "presumptions, rather than as rules that must dictate results when they
apply").
126. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 197, 203 (1991); see also Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 546-48 (1988) (discussing "presumptive formalism"
and suggesting it be called "presumptive positivism").
127. SCHAUER, supra note 126, at 196.
128. Barnett, supra note 26, at 307-19 (describing the role of presumptions in consent
theory).
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While the parties' consent makes out a prima facie case of contractual
obligation, Barnett argues, the case may be rebutted by a showing of
circumstances, generally coterminous with traditional contract defenses, that
deprive that consent "of its normal moral, and therefore legal, significance."' 2 9
Third, Williston's defense of freedom of contract allegedly sets him apart
from the new formalists. Here again, the conventional wisdom draws a
distinction between Williston's essentialism and the pragmatism of
contemporary scholarship. According to the conventional wisdom, Williston
shares the classical belief that freedom of contract is a conceptual imperative, a
principle that follows necessarily from an understanding of contracts' true
nature.130 This essentialism supposedly leads Williston to reject all limits on
party autonomy, even limits based on health and safety grounds-to endorse,
along with other classicists, the Lochner Court's holding that the Constitution
prohibits legislation that interferes with parties' right to contract on terms they
see fit.' 3' The association with Lochner casts a reactionary taint on Williston,
and in fact some scholars have suggested that Williston's essentialism masks an
anti-egalitarian bias. For example, Morton Horwitz writes that Williston's
objective theory of contracts acts to "disguise gross disparities of bargaining
power under a facade of neutral and formal rules."'132
By contrast, contemporary defenses of freedom of contract tend to rely on
functional arguments. Most of these defenses come from the law-and-
economics perspective and stress the efficiency gains that result from honoring
party autonomy. 33 Contracts increase efficiency by allowing parties to trade
goods and services to other parties who value them more highly. 34 As a result,
law-and-economics scholarship teaches, society generally should refrain from
interfering with parties' choices, for example, by prescribing minimum wage
terms in employment contracts. 35 Society can better address distributional
129. Id. at 318.
130. See Mooney, supra note 24, at 1133 (discussing the "classical, conceptualist ethic
emphasizing... 'freedom of contract' and marketplace economics").
131. See Grey, supra note 28, at 494-96 (discussing the "canonical" connection between
Langdellism and Lochnerism). For further discussion of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), see infra notes 303-04, 307-08 and accompanying text.
132. HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 201.
133. See F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL A 1D RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1, 7
(F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) ("[T]he intellectual revival of freedom of contract has been led by
scholars in the law-and-economics tradition.").
134. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 71-72 (1995)
(discussing economics of voluntary exchange).
135. See id. at 88 (arguing that it is "unwise" for the state to impose minimum wage laws).
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concerns through tax-and-transfer measures. 136 Law-and-economics scholarship
does accept regulations that weed out contracts that do not reflect real choice-
contracts based on deception or threats, for example-as well as contracts that
involve some market failure, such as the presence of externalities. 137 Generally
speaking, though, most law-and-economics scholars hold that the efficiency
losses that result from broader limitations on party autonomy outweigh the
benefits. 118
One important strand of law-and-economics scholarship addresses
freedom of contract from the point of view of institutional competence. This
scholarship, too, relies on pragmatic arguments. In his influential book, The
Limits of Freedom of Contract, Michael Trebilcock dismisses abstract inquiries
into the proper scope of party autonomy. 139  Such inquiries involve the
balancing of a multitude of conflicting social values and are thus likely to be
unsuccessful. Rather, scholars should focus on a more practical question,
namely, determining which government actor seems most likely to reach an
appropriate balance among these many social values. 140  For example,
Trebilcock writes, courts typically lack the information and expertise necessary
to engage in a sensitive evaluation of social conditions. As a result, courts
typically should refrain from invalidating private transactions on the basis of
wider social values. 141 Regulators, by contrast, are more likely to have "an
appropriately systemic perspective."'142 They are thus better equipped than
courts to identify those market failures, such as information asymmetries and
collective-action problems, that mayjustify invalidating private agreements.143
Finally, in today's terms, Williston's work seems strikingly
undertheorized.' 44 Like other classical scholars, Williston devotes himself
136. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (3d ed.
2003) (stating that "redistribution through the government's tax and transfer system may be
cheaper and is likely to be more precise").
137. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40-43 (3d ed.
2000) (discussing market failures); EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 80-82 (discussing standard
contract defenses like misrepresentation and duress).
138. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 82-89 (rejecting attempts to expand traditional
limitations on freedom of contract to cover more intrusive regulation of bargains); Buckley,
supra note 133, at I I (noting that law and economics scholars have rebutted "[m]any of the
broader objections to free bargaining").
139. TREBILCOCK, supra note 46, at 248.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 248-50.
142. Id. at 251.
143. Id. Like most other law-and-economics scholars, Trebilcock expresses reluctance to
extend contract regulation beyond the context of market failures. Id. at 251-53.
144. See Benson, supra note 26, at 2 (stating that Williston's work is "untheoretical").
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primarily to doctrinal analysis-to the identification and development of the
principles that underlie judicial decisions and, to a lesser extent, commercial
statutes.' 41 Williston's work is not merely descriptive; he seeks connections
among doctrines, critiques incoherence, and suggests ways to harmonize
apparently inconsistent precedents. 46 But apart from occasional references to
common sense and other intuitive notions, policy arguments do not interest
him. 47 Williston largely ignores big-picture questions about the political and
economic goals of contract law; he does not look to other disciplines to gain a
deeper understanding of the legal system. 48 Moreover, Williston shows little
inclination to do empirical work on the complex ways in which legal rules
interact with commercial practice. 49 "[F]rom the standpoint of legal or social
thought," Lawrence Friedman laments, Williston's work amounts to "volume
after volume of a heavy void."'
5 0
By contrast, contemporary scholarship seeks to give formalism a stronger
theoretical foundation. Straightforward doctrinal analysis does not appeal to
the new formalists; they care much more about explaining the legal regime in
terms of functional utility.' 5' Moreover, when they make claims about
formalism's practical benefits, the new formalists do not rely on common-sense
intuitions. Rather, they attempt to back up their assertions with sophisticated
145. Cf Posner, supra note 14, at 1316 (describing traditional legal scholarship).
146. See Benson, supra note 26, at 3 n.4 (stating that Williston and other classical contracts
scholars "systematically present[ed] the legal point of view by clarifying definitions ... and by
exploring.., their implications and their conceptual interconnections").
147. For example, Duncan Kennedy complains (somewhat unfairly, as it turns out) that
"Williston offer[s] no policy rationale at all for objectivism." Duncan Kennedy, From the Will
Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form ", 100
COLUM. L. REv. 94, 130(2000). For more on Williston's explanation of the objective theory of
contract interpretation, see infra notes 370-97 and accompanying text.
148. For example, Williston rejects the idea that law professors should mix class discussion
of legal questions with extra-legal topics like "political economy, sociology, [and] philosophy,"
as such material would detract from subjects of"more direct professional importance." Samuel
Williston, Book Review, 43 HARV. L. REV. 972, 974 (1930) (reviewing J.H. LANDMAN, THE
CASE METHOD OF STUDYING LAW (1930)).
149. Writing of empirical work in 1929, Williston observes:
[T]hough well-settled general business custom should generally determine the
desirable rule of law, it is easy to verify the statement that on many matters business
custom varies widely not only in different parts of the United States, but within the
limits of a single city. It is not infrequently better to make business custom follow
the law than to seek to apply the opposite method.
WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 150.
150. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 543.
151. See Pildes, supra note 18, at 619 (stating that new formalists "functionally assess[]"
legal rules "in terms of how they interact with social norms").
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economic models and empirical studies. 152 For example, in defending objective
contract interpretation, Schwartz and Scott rely on the insights of contract
theory.'53 This branch of microeconomics, they argue, demonstrates why firms
generally prefer objective interpretation to more contextual approaches.
Similarly, in explaining the benefits of formalism, Bernstein has conducted a
number of empirical studies of private arbitral regimes that show how a
combination of formalist adjudication and informal reputational sanctions can
serve the needs of contracting parties. 154 Even those relatively few
contemporary formalists who embrace essentialism show more interest in
theory than Williston does. One cannot really imagine Williston making the
effort to demonstrate, as Weinrib does, the ways in which contract remedies
cohere with Kantian notions of corrective justice. 55
Il. Rediscovering Williston
This Part restores a more correct and balanced version of Williston's
jurisprudence, filling in the pragmatic and flexible aspects of his work that the
conventional account ignores. First, Part IH.A discusses Williston's rejection
of essentialism. Williston endorses axiomatic legal reasoning on pragmatic
grounds; both in defending the use of general principles and in deriving the
principles themselves, Williston emphasizes real-world advantages, not
conformity to abstract philosophy. Next, Part II.B discusses Williston's views
on the presumptive nature of legal logic. It shows that Williston is willing to
forgo the rigid application of rules in circumstances where they would lead to
seriously undesirable social consequences.
Part I.C explores Williston's views on legal reform and freedom of
contract. Although Williston is somewhat conservative, he is hardly
152. See id. (stating that new formalism "is motivated, justified, and understood in
precisely the modernist, hyper-policy analytic vein that constitutes the direct rejection of
Langdellian formalism"); Posner, supra note 27, at 879-80 (contrasting the economic
sophistication of contemporary contract scholarship with the methodological sloppiness of
contract scholarship before the 1970s).
153. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 548 ("We draw heavily on contract theory to
construct our normative theory of contracts.").
154. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 115, at 1735-45 (discussing cotton arbitrators); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code 's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1769-71 (1996) (discussing feed and grain
arbitrators).
155. See Weinrib, supra note 113, at 57-58 (discussing "[t]he Kantian account of
contractual right"); id. at 65-70 (discussing "Kant's views about contractual entitlement"); id. at
102 (discussing "the Kantian account of contract").
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reactionary. Williston does not oppose reform in itself; he merely believes that
reform should proceed gradually so as not to upset settled expectations.
Moreover, he takes a moderate view of freedom of contract, criticizing the
"more obviously barbarous applications" of caveat emptor156 and what he
believes to be the extreme libertarianism of the Lochner Court.
Finally, Part III.D discusses the undertheorized quality of Williston's
scholarship. While Williston's reliance on intuitive justifications for legal rules
can strike a contemporary academic reader as unsophisticated, his approach
makes a certain amount of sense in light of his goals and intended audience.
Indeed, Williston's common-sense jurisprudence shares some surprising
affinities with what Richard Posner calls "everyday pragmatism" in law, 157 a
rough and ready approach that devalues high theory.
This Part presents a number of examples to support its claims about
Williston. It draws on his occasional jurisprudential pieces as well as his
doctrinal scholarship; it also looks to some of the many statutes he drafts over
the course of his career. Williston's output is enormous, and one needs to be
selective. Nonetheless, this Part discusses examples that, taken together, give a
fair account of the body of his work. It focuses on several problems in contract
theory that continue to inspire heated debate today: the bargain requirement
and promissory estoppel, the objective theory of contract interpretation, the
proper scope of freedom of contract, and the value of empirical research.
A. Pragmatism and Ideal Rules
Like other classical formalists, Williston favors the use of general
principles in legal reasoning. He sees contract law as a kind of "science"-a
system of fundamental axioms, relatively few in number, that can provide the
basis for deductive reasoning. 15 For example, in an address he gives to the
American Bar Association's Section on Legal Education early in his academic
career, Williston argues that the scholar should gear his work to "the ideal
rules:"
This means that he must keep his own mind and that of his students
constantly addressed to the general rule, free from arbitrary exceptions, and
must use the particular cases to bring the rule out, rather than emphasize the
importance of inconsistencies and peculiarities. For the ideal of the law is
156. Williston, supra note 44, at 475.
157. POSNER, supra note 54, at 49.
158. See, e.g., Williston, supra note 37, at 239-40 (advocating "a systematic
jurisprudence").
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towards a few general principles, while in practice, with the increasing
complexity of human affairs, the number of minor rules and applications is
always increasing.159
Similarly, the preface to the 1920 contracts treatise laments the fact that "[t]he
law of contracts... tends from its very size to fall apart," and argues that a
focus on "fundamental principles" provides a necessary unity to the field.' 60
Indeed, Williston's chief complaint against the Realists is that they treat the law
as a set of narrow, unrelated categories-a "wilderness of single instances."'16'
Yet Williston's endorsement of "ideal rules" does not stem from an
essentialist understanding. It is "[o]bvious," he writes, that "contractual
liability, like all other liability," is ultimately "based on policy. ,162 Williston
does not perceive contract as a Platonic entity; for him, there is no brooding
omnipresence in the sky. Nor does Williston think of himself as discovering, in
Aristotelian fashion, contract's immanent structure. Like the new formalists,
Williston views law as a social construct that one must justify in terms of real-
world benefits. Law is a "science," he writes, "but it is a pragmatic science."' 63
Williston favors formalism precisely because of its practical advantages.
For example, Williston argues that general legal concepts promote
predictability in commercial relationships.'" If law were merely a collection of
particularized rules without unifying principles, he argues, lawyers could not
advise clients with any degree of accuracy. 65 Parties could not feel secure
about their contractual rights and duties, and they might be less likely to enter
into mutually beneficial agreements. Moreover, uncertainty would promote
costly litigation that would drain the resources of the parties and the public at
159. Samuel Williston, The Necessity of Idealism in Teaching Law, 2 AM. L. SCHOOL REv.
201, 201 (1908) (emphasis added).
160. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, at iii.
161. Williston, supra note 37, at 240 (internal quotations omitted); see also WILLISTON,
supra note 35, at 213 (criticizing Realists). For more on Williston's critique of the Realists, see
infra notes 444-58 and accompanying text.
162. Williston, supra note 45, at 368.
163. According to Williston:
Law is a science but it is a pragmatic science. It can rarely deal with the absolute.
Questions of how far and how much constantly intrude, and the questions of degree
thus introduced require for their solution determination of doubtful facts and
comparative valuing of interests, which have no mathematical equivalents.
WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 202.
164. See Williston, supra note 37, at 239 (discussing "systematic jurisprudence");
WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 75 (discussing the importance of "concise absolute rules" in
commercial law).
165. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 213 (discussing difficulty of leaming and applying a
body of law that lacks "connecting threads of principle").
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large.166  Williston frequently points out that the success of a legal system
depends not only on its capacity to reach acceptable results at trial but also on
its capacity to delineate rights and duties without the need for litigation. 161
Williston recognizes that there is a potential practical downside to the use
of general concepts in law. Categorical principles can lead to harsh results in
particular cases.16  But he believes that this danger is exaggerated.169 Legal
complexity also can cause hardship, for example, by creating traps for the
unwary or opportunities for sharp practice. By adhering to general concepts,
judges can reduce these potential dangers. Moreover, categorical principles can
help rein in willful judges who might be inclined to decide a matter on the basis
of personal whim rather than "the general justice of the case."' 70 In any event,
as discussed below, Williston believes that legal rules should have only
presumptive effect and that in particularly exigent circumstances judges should
refrain from applying them.
171
Williston's pragmatism is also evident in the way he derives the general
principles themselves. Like other classical scholars, Williston takes a positivist
view of law. 172 Under this view, law is simply the command of the sovereign,
the set of rules that the state requires its subjects to obey. Thus, Williston does
not attempt to derive the principles of contract law from metaphysical
philosophy. Such an approach would be a waste of time-"an excursion into
166. Cf id. at 213 (discussing effect of legal uncertainty on litigation).
167. "The law is not important solely or even chiefly for thejust disposal of litigated cases.
The settlement of the rights of a community without recourse to the courts can only be
satisfactorily arranged when logic is respected." Samuel Williston, Repudiation of Contracts
(Part II), 14 HARV. L. REv. 421,438 (1901) [hereinafter Williston, Repudiation (Part II)]; see
also 3 WILuSTON, supra note 2, § 1321, at 2373 (restating Williston's belief in the value of
settling disputes via logical rules without litigation); WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 2 ("[T]he
great triumph of a system of law is that justice is thereby attained in the vast majority of cases
without litigation."); Samuel Williston, Gifts of Rights Under Contracts in Writing by Delivery
of the Writing, 40 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1930) (stating that litigation over certain assigned contract
claims is not desirable).
168. See WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 2-3 (acknowledging that general principles can
create hardships); Samuel Williston, Fashions in Law with Illustrations from the Law of
Contracts, 21 TEx. L. REV. 119, 134 (1942) (noting that "insistence on applying strictly in all
cases a... recognized principle may... produce an unfortunate result in a particular case").
169. WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 97 (providing examples of how general rules can
promote justice).
170. Id. at 59; see also Williston, supra note 168, at 138 (suggesting that the "evasion of
general rules" can promote excessive discretion in judges).
171. See infra notes 245-99 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's views on the
presumptive force of legal principles).
172. See Kennedy, supra note 147, at 129 (characterizing Williston as "a Holmesian
positivist").
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cloud-land."'173 Instead, Williston looks to case law. Judicial decisions about
contracts provide the raw materials for his systematic jurisprudence.174
Before explaining how Williston goes about this task, it is useful to
underscore the pragmatism that is inherent in the starting point. Critics
condemn Williston's reliance on general principles as disdainful of real-world
concerns. But a jurisprudence that adheres closely to case law is unlikely to
ignore social propositions. The judges who wrote the opinions on which
Williston relies were members of American society, and one can safely assume
that over the course of years on the bench they developed a working knowledge
of American commercial practice. 75 Even discounting for occasional bias and
incompetence, one cannot assume that these judges routinely rendered
decisions at odds with that practice. 7 6 A jurisprudence that builds on case law
is thus at least as likely to reflect actual social propositions as one that looks to
metaphysical systems for its justification. As Williston writes, sticking to
decided decisions can protect against an academic tendency "to get too far from
the earth.'
77
How, then, does Williston derive the ideal rules? Williston does not often
describe his methodology, but one can piece it together from his occasional
jurisprudential writings and from the corpus of his work. Williston believes
that a scholar must study a body of case law and identify "the principles,
whether clearly formulated or not... , which underlie the decisions."' 78 In a
largely inductive process, the scholar must observe the data-that is, read the
cases-and, reasoning upward, discover the general principles that the data
reflect. 79 Once identified, the principles serve as a kind of canon by which one
can judge the correctness of the cases themselves. Sound cases conform to the
principles; unsound cases do not. Williston captures this idea in a phrase he
173. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 203.
174. See Williston, supra note 159, at 201 ("Good teaching of law... always occupies
itself with the concrete .... ."); id. at 203 (asserting that a law student should "study[] the actual
decisions of the court" and not "get too far from the earth in theoretical jurisprudence").
175. See Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense ofLegal Formalism, 36
IND. L. REV. 57, 65 (2003) (stating that "common law judges of the formalist era were the
products of the American society in which they worked" and their "concepts had some
substantial relation to practice").
176. See id. ("It would be surprising in the extreme if [these judges] came up with
conclusions.., alien to the conventional understandings and traditions of [their] society.").
177. Williston, supra note 159, at 203.
178. Id. at 202.
179. See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1434 (explaining that classicists believed that the
"axiomatic principles of the common law... were to be initially discovered by reasoning
inductively upward from the cases").
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often repeats: "stare principiis.'' i80 Although courts should generally follow
precedent in the interests of stability, wrong decisions ultimately should not
stand in the way of sound principles.1
8 1
Nonetheless, Williston does not believe that a scholar can identify legal
concepts solely through induction. Various "principled" accounts of doctrine
can exist. The scholar must develop the best account-the one that relies on
concepts that are general, uniform, consistent with the body of law as a whole,
and, crucially, in tune with real-world needs. Williston makes this point
repeatedly. The ideal rule, he writes in 1908, should not "violate sound views
of political economy;" it should "conform to the usages or requirements of
business." 8 2 Similarly, in an article entitled Change in the Law, which he
writes in 1935, Williston insists that a legal principle should not only be general
and coherent, but "should also conform to social needs and not violate what
may be called the mores of the community.' 83 Indeed, because "social needs"
and "mores" change over time, legal principles must themselves evolve. 184 "To
the extent that social needs and mores change, legal principles should change"
too. 185
Williston thus believes that one must justify a legal principle largely in
terms of its practical benefits. One could give several examples of his
methodology, but consider only two. The first, an example that Williston
himself uses to explain the derivation of legal principles, relates to the specific
enforcement of real estate transactions. 8 6  Williston poses the following
hypothetical. Suppose that two parties, seller and purchaser, make a contract
for the sale of improved land. After the parties sign the contract, but before
seller actually transfers the property to purchaser, an accident causes damage to
the building on the land without the fault of either party. Must purchaser
nonetheless take the land and pay the original contract price? The majority
180. See, e.g., Williston, supra note 37, at 239 (arguing for "a fuller recognition of stare
principiis as a qualification of stare decisis," a recognition that would "involve[] both a greater
willingness to overrule outworn cases and outworn principles, and a greater frankness in so
doing"); see also Grey, supra note 94, at 26 (discussing Williston's use of this phrase).
181. See Williston, supra note 37, at 239 (arguing that courts should be more "willing[] to
overrule outworn cases and outworn principles").
182. Williston, supra note 159, at 202.
183. Williston, supra note 37, at 239.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. For discussions of this example, see WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 259-60; Williston,
supra note 37, at 240-41. See generally Robert L. Flores, Risk of Loss in Sales: A Missing
Chapter in the History of the U. C.C.: Through Llewellyn to Williston and a Bit Beyond, 27
PAC. L.J. 161 (1996) (discussing Williston's treatment of risk of loss).
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view among courts at Williston's time was that purchaser must do so. Even
though purchaser was not in possession of the property, the reasoning went,
purchaser was the equitable owner. As a result, purchaser bore the risk of loss
from accidental damage.
Williston believes that the majority rule is unsound. 8 7  On correct
principle, seller should bear the risk of loss; stare principiis requires courts to
overturn decisions endorsing the majority rule. Williston attacks the majority
rule on both theoretical and practical grounds. First, he points out, the majority
rule is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of equitable ownership. By
definition, an equitable owner has the right to rents and profits from the land.
But before the transfer of possession, purchaser does not enjoy these rights;
seller does. As a result, purchaser cannot be said to be the true equitable
owner. ,88 Moreover, Williston continues, the majority rule is inconsistent with
case law in related areas. 8 9  For example, under standard impossibility
doctrine, a party is not required to pay for the use of real property that has been
damaged by accident.'9° Thus, according to Williston, a court should not force
a purchaser to accept conveyance of real property in similar circumstances. 19'
The majority rule thus has "as little support in the decisions as it does in
principle."'192 In addition, Williston argues, the majority rule makes no sense as
a practical matter. 9 3 Most parties would assume, reasonably, that seller bears
the risk of loss until transfer of possession.' 94 By upsetting settled expectations,
the majority rule serves only to surprise and confuse parties. 9 5 Moreover,
187. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 259. For Williston's full treatment of this problem, see
2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, §§ 928-54, at 1765-1809; see also Samuel Williston, The Risk of
Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 HARv. L. REv. 106, 121-30
(1895) (examining the "propriety" of imposing the risk of loss on the purchaser).
188. See Williston, supra note 37, at 241 (arguing that a purchaser cannot be an "owner in
equity" unless "the purchaser is given possession and the right to rents and profits of the
estate"); see also 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 938, at 1782-83 (arguing that a purchaser is not
entitled to the rights of ownership until he achieves possession under the contract).
189. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 943, at 179 1.
190. 2 id. at 1791-92 (discussing Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863)).
191. See 2 id. at 1791 (arguing that Taylor is "indistinguishable" from the risk-of-loss
situation "on any sound principle").
192. 2 id. § 937, at 1781.
193. See Flores, supra note 186, at 185-86, 191 (discussing Williston's treatment of
practical considerations in the risk-of-loss context). According to Flores, Williston is the first
scholar to pay serious attention to practical considerations in risk-of-loss law. Id. at 186.
194. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 940, at 1785 (discussing the intentions of the parties
in this situation).
195. See Williston, supra note 37, at 241 (stating that the majority rule would "surprise
most laymen").
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"[t]he practical advantages of leaving the risk with [seller] until transfer of
possession are obvious."' 196 It is always "wiser to have the party in possession
of property care for it at his peril, rather than at the peril of another."' 97 Indeed,
in the typical case, seller already has an insurance policy on the property at the
time of contract. Purchaser, by contrast, does not.' 98
Another example of the role of pragmatism in Williston's derivation of
legal principles involves, perhaps surprisingly, the consideration requirement.
Williston devotes substantial time to consideration over the course of his career,
working out the contours of the bargain principle in a series of articles and in
his contracts treatise. 99 Most of his writing on the subject, one must concede,
tends to support the conventional wisdom about him. The reader finds page
after page of close doctrinal argument that bears little apparent relation to
practical concerns. It can be pretty heavy going. For example, in a fairly
lengthy article entitled Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, which he writes in
1914, Williston sets out to clear up the confusion that exists on the question
whether, and under what circumstances, a promise can serve as "a sufficient
consideration for a counter-promise." 20 After meticulously demonstrating the
flaws in other scholars' attempts to resolve the matter, Williston announces his
own conclusion, justified as a matter of logic alone, a triumph of abstraction:
The result of [my] argument is that no briefer definition of sufficient
consideration in a bilateral contract can be given than this: Mutual
promises each of which assures some act or forbearance that will be, or
apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the
promisee, and neither of which is rendered void by any rule of law other
than that relating to consideration, are sufficient consideration for one
another.20'
196. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 942, at 1790.
197. 2 id.
198. 2 id. at 1791.
199. For examples of Williston's work on consideration, see generally I WILUsrON, supra
note 2, §§ 99-204, at 188-410; Samuel Williston, Accord and Satisfaction, 17 HARv. L. REv.
459 (1904); Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARv. L. REV. 503
(1914) [hereinafter Williston, Bilateral Contracts]; Samuel Williston, Contracts for the Benefit
of a Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REv. 767 (1902); Samuel Williston, Successive Promises of the
Same Performance, 8 HARV. L. REv. 27 (1894) [hereinafter Williston, Successive Promises];
Samuel Williston, The Effect of One Void Promise in a Bilateral Agreement, 25 COLUM. L. REv.
857 (1925); Williston, supra note 50.
200. Williston, Bilateral Contracts, supra note 199, at 518.
201. Id. at 527-28. For more on Williston's definition of consideration and his differences
with other formalists on the question, see JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 174-75 (1991).
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Consideration in Bilateral Contracts shows Williston at his most abstract.
But it does not reflect the whole picture. On other occasions, Williston
discusses consideration in substantially more pragmatic terms. For example,
consider Williston's defense of the pre-existing duty rule. The rule, which
prohibits certain contract modifications, arises in situations like thefollowing.22 Suppose that a builder contracts to build a house for a landowner.
The builder begins work, but he decides that he has made a bad deal and
informs the landowner that he will not complete the house at the agreed price.
However, if the landowner agrees to pay him more money, the builder will
agree to complete the house. The landowner agrees to the additional
compensation, and the parties make a second contract. After the builder builds
the house, the landowner refuses to pay the additional compensation. What
result?
Under the pre-existing duty rule, the landowner's promise to pay the
additional compensation would be unenforceable. Williston endorses this
result in an early article entitled Successive Promises of the Same
Performance.20 1 Williston defends the rule in part on logical grounds. Because
the builder already has a contractual obligation to complete the house, the
landowner derives no legal benefit from the builder's second promise. As a
result, there is no consideration to support the landowner's promise to pay
additional money for the work.2 0°4 But Williston also points out that the rule
serves the very practical concern of preventing what contemporary writers refer
to as the "'hold-up game.' 205 In a situation like the hypothetical case, there is
strong reason to believe that the landowner's promise to pay more money for
the same work is the product of "compulsion"; enforcing the landowner's
202. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two Contractual
Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 62 (2001) (describing the pre-existing duty rule).
203. Williston, Successive Promises, supra note 199.
204. See id. at 30 ("Granting that a benefit or advantage moving from the promisee to the
promisor is a good consideration, surely nothing can be regarded by the law as a benefit to the
promisor unless it is something more than what he was already entitled to."); see also I
WILLSTON, supra note 2, § 130, at 276 (arguing that "performance under the second agreement"
is not "a legal benefit to the promisor since he was already entitled to have the work done").
Alternatively, one might say that builder's second promise cannot create any new legal
detriment to builder, "since ... he was already bound to do the work." Id.
205. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things Apply": Necessary and
Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1288, 1297 n.31 (2002) (quoting
Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974)). In circumstances not presenting the hold-up game,
Williston suggests that a statute be enacted to make certain written promises to modify binding
even in the absence of consideration. See infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text
(discussing Williston's support for the Uniform Written Obligations Act).
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promise in these circumstances would be "very harsh. 20 6 Williston makes a
similar point elsewhere, using the example of a debtor attempting to renegotiate
the terms of his debt:
[I]f the law were otherwise [that is, if there were no pre-existing duty rule],
debtors would demand discounts on their just debts even more freely than
they do .... If my debtor owes me ten dollars, and he says, "Well, I will
pay you eight," the implication, if not spoken in terms, is readily implied,
"If you won't take eight you won't get any until a long time," or "at the tail
end of a lawsuit." It is not desirable that a bargain forced on a creditor in
this way should be enforceable.
207
Indeed, in a 1937 article entitled The Law of Contracts Since the
Restatement, Williston defends the consideration requirement on entirely
pragmatic grounds.208 In the article, Williston addresses complaints about the
technicality of the requirement and the fact that it "not infrequently" produces
undesirable results.2° In answering these complaints, Williston does not argue
that the doctrine is essential to contract's "true" nature or that it is consistent
with a "correct" theory of the parties' rights. Rather, he argues that
consideration is a necessary evil, a concession to reality. Courts simply cannot
enforce every promise, he reasons; the law needs some screening mechanism.
Consideration serves that function tolerably well, certainly as well as proposed
substitutes like the civil law concept of"cause., 210 Moreover, even if one could
come up with a better test for enforceability in the abstract, the consideration
requirement is already deeply embedded in American law. Abolishing the
doctrine would disturb settled business expectations and cause great confusion
as the courts defined the contours of whatever new test took its place.
21 1
Williston's understanding of consideration as a practical device explains
his consistent support for a reform that would have abolished the requirement
in circumstances showing clearly that the promisor intended to be legally
bound. In 1925, Williston drafts the Uniform Written Obligations Act, a model
statute providing that a signed written promise would be enforceable, even
without consideration, if the writing stated that the promisor intended it to be
206. Williston, Successive Promises, supra note 199, at 31, 32. For some reason, this
practical argument does not make its way into the treatise's discussion of the pre-existing duty
rule. See generally I WILISTON, supra note 2, §§ 130-131b, at 275-89.
207. SAMUEL WILUSTON, PROBLEMS IN THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 10 (1933).
208. See Williston, supra note 50, at 173 (presenting a pragmatic argument for retaining
the consideration requirement despite its shortcomings).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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legally binding.212 The common law had allowed such a result under the
doctrine of the sealed instrument, but the use of seals had presented too great a
possibility of fraud, and by the early twentieth century most states had
abolished the doctrine.213 Williston views the Written Obligations Act as a
"moderate and reasonable" substitute.214 In the presence of a writing signed by
the promisor, he believes, proof of a bargain should be unnecessary; only a
misguided conceptualism would forbid a promisor from making a binding
gratuitous promise if he clearly expressed his desire to do so. 215  Despite
Williston's efforts, only two states adopt the statute, a failure that genuinely
puzzles him.21 6  "[P]robably," he reflects, the act's proponents had
"inadequately presented" it to state legislatures.21 7
The emphasis on pragmatic values, evident in the risk-of-loss example and
in at least some of his writing on consideration, makes plain that one should not
think of Williston as an essentialist. 218 Indeed, Williston often criticizes what
212. Id. at 175.
213. See id. at 174 (listing the twenty-seven states that had abolished "the distinction
between sealed and unsealed written contracts"); see also WILLISTON, supra note 201, at 9
(explaining the problems with seals).
214. Williston, supra note 50, at 175. "It is most unfortunate," Williston writes in the 1920
contracts treatise, "if no method be left in a system of law by which a confessedly voluntary
promise may be binding." I WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 219, at 432.
215. WILLISTON, supra note 207, at 9. Williston believes that the Uniform Written
Obligations Act will allow contract modifications in cases that do not present the danger of the
hold-up game. See Williston, supra note 50, at 175 (discussing the Act). For more on the pre-
existing duty rule and the hold-up game, see supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
216. Williston, supra note 50, at 175. "That any serious consequences can follow from
making consideration unnecessary where such is the deliberate intention of the parties seems to
the last degree improbable." Samuel Williston, In Reply to Prof. Oliphant, 14 A.B.A. J. 554,
554 (1928).
217. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 227.
218. Another example of the interplay between logic and practical justice in Williston's
jurisprudence involves anticipatory repudiation. Suppose that a contract between A and B
provides that A will render performance on a specified date. Before that date, A repudiates the
contract by stating that he does not intend to perform when the date arises. Under the doctrine
of anticipatory repudiation, B would no longer have a duty to perform its obligations under the
contract and could sue A immediately for breach. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, § 8.20, at
602 ("[C]ourts have accepted the general rule that an anticipatory repudiation gives the injured
party an immediate claim to damages for total breach, in addition to discharging that party's
remaining duties of performance.").
Williston accepts the idea that B no longer should have a duty to perform in these
circumstances, reasoning that "[e]very consideration ofjustice requires" that result. Williston,
Repudiation (Part II), supra note 167, at 434. For decades, however, and in the face of a
growing consensus against him, Williston rejects the idea that B should be allowed to bring an
immediate action for breach. Williston's objections are principally based on logic: Allowing
such an action would be incoherent because A technically could not be said to have breached
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he sees as essentialism in the work of others. For example, despite the
conventional tendency to link them, Williston often distances himself from
Langdell.219 In his autobiography, Williston criticizes Langdell's "extremely
conservative" thinking, chiding Langdell for refusing to consider cases decided
after 1850 and for being unwilling to accept "changes in law as a constant and
necessary process, however gradual and slow.,,220 Echoing Holmes' famous
jibe, Williston refers to Langdell as "a legal theologian," a "stem[] Calvinist"
who focused on logical abstractions at the expense of real-world conditions. 22
One can hardly imagine Williston asserting, as Langdell did with respect to the
mailbox rule, that concerns about substantial justice and the interests of the
contracting parties are "irrelevant" to legal analysis. 222
In fact, in his rejection of metaphysics and his embrace of pragmatism,
Williston shares more in common with today's new formalists. Of course, one
should not overstate the analogy. Williston focuses primarily on doctrinal
system building; he does not give policy arguments nearly the same degree of
attention as black-letter analysis. Moreover, compared to the new formalists,
Williston is noticeably undertheorized. Williston does not attempt to support
until the specified date. See 3 WILuSTON, supra note 2, § 1296, at 2345 ("One who contracts to
do a certain thing on a certain contingency or at a certain time does not and indeed cannot break
that promise unless the contingency happens or the time arrives."); Williston, Repudiation (Part
II), supra note 167, at 428 (arguing that, "[flrom a technical point of view," the absence of a
breach "seems obvious"). Williston also argues, however, that allowing an immediate action
would create "objectionable" practical problems, id. at 439, and would also be unjust toA, who
would be "held liable on a promise he never made." Id. at 438. Interestingly, towards the end
of his career, Williston backs off his position on anticipatory repudiation, conceding somewhat
sheepishly that his rejection of the right of immediate action might have carried logic a bit too
far. See Williston, supra note 168, at 134 n.32 ("The present writer's published opposition to
the doctrine of anticipatory breach may perhaps be cited as [an] instance of... restricted
adherence to logical consequences from inadequate premises."). For more on Williston's views
regarding anticipatory repudiation, see Keith A. Rowley, A Brief History of Anticipatory
Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CiN. L. REV. 565,602-05, 609 n.252 (2001).
219. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation
and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427,464 n.218 (2000) (noting Williston's portrayal of
Langdell as "weird or, at least, quirky").
220. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 200. Williston writes that Langdell's conservatism
resulted in part from Langdell's poor eyesight, "an infirmity which overtook him before he had
been teaching in Cambridge many years," which caused him to stop reading cases. Id.
221. Id. For more on Holmes' jibe, see Siegel, supra note 17, at 1524.
222. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing Langdell's stance on the
mailbox rule). The 1920 contracts treatise notes the logical flaws in the mailbox rule but
accepts it as an established doctrine and does not spend much time discussing it. I WILLISTON,
supra note 2, § 81, at 143-44. The 1936 treatise states that "the law is so well settled as to make
discussion academic." I SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 81, at 237 (rev. ed. 1936).
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his assertions about practical benefits with empirical data or sophisticated
economic models; as in the risk-of-loss example, he prefers to rely on common-
sense notions about practical advantages or business convenience and to leave
it at that. Even his concept of stare principiis is more or less intuitive.
Williston never attempts to develop a theory that explains when, precisely, a
court should abandon precedent in favor of correct principle.223
This Article addresses these aspects of Williston's scholarship below. For
now, the key point is that, both in defending an axiomatic jurisprudence and in
deriving the axioms themselves, Williston emphasizes real-world benefits, not
conformity to abstract philosophy or adherence to judicial fiat. In this way,
Williston's jurisprudence is properly seen as pragmatic, not dogmatic.
B. Legal Logic and the Role of Presumptions
Williston maintains that logic plays a vital role in the proper functioning of
a legal regime. Once one has identified a field's general principles, logic
provides the basis for developing those principles into a set of clear rules for the
resolution of legal disputes.224 For example, the consideration principle
necessarily implies the traditional rule about gift promises. The consideration
principle teaches that only promises that result from bargains are enforceable.
As gift promises by definition do not result from bargains, they are, as a matter
of logic, unenforceable. Thus the traditional rule: Parties who rely on gift
promises, even reasonably, can receive no redress from the courts.
For Williston, the central tasks of both scholar and judge follow from this
understanding of law. The scholar should trace the application of a field's
general principles in a wide variety of factual settings and construct a
systematic doctrinal jurisprudence, a comprehensive set of rules established on
the basis of analytic logic. 225 As anyone who has read his work can attest,
Williston pursues this task with tenacity and skill. The judge, in turn, should
decide a legal dispute by applying the correct rule to the facts of a case and
declaring the logically necessary outcome. The judge should not make an
223. See Grey, supra note 94, at 26 ("[S]tare decisis jostled against what Williston called
stare principiis, without any formal higher level principle to decide between them.").
224. See Eisenberg, supra note 102, at 1750-51 (discussing the deductive method in
classical contract law).
225. See WILLIsToN, supra note 35, at 108 ("It is also part of a teacher's work to a greater
or less extent to systematize the law .... "); see also Williston, supra note 168, at 133
(discussing the approach of classical legal scholars); Williston, supra note 37, at 238-39
(discussing classical legal pedagogy).
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exception to a logically determinative rule simply because he thinks the equities
of a case require it.11
6
The stress on analytic logic can make Williston's work seem arid and
abstract. Once again, though, it is important to appreciate why Williston
227endorses logic in law. Williston does not favor doctrinal coherence for its
aesthetic qualities, its elegance and symmetry.228 Rather, he believes that
analytic logic serves at least three highly important practical values. 229 First,
there are pedagogical benefits. Logic makes it easier to learn and understand
the law.23° Without logic, legal doctrine becomes a mass of unrelated rules and
exceptions, a "dead weight" that the mind can lift only with great difficulty. 31
Moreover, a focus on formal logic tends to equalize relations between professor
and student, thus promoting more "profitable discussion in class. '232  A
professor who relies on "assertions of economic and social desirability,
incapable of proof," can simply over-awe students into submission, but no
amount of professorial prestige can make "inconclusive logic satisfactory. '23 3
226. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 215 (discussing judicial temptation to make
exceptions "to avoid a harsh application of a general rule").
227. One commentator argues that the concern with logic reflects Williston's psychological
troubles, in particular, his lifelong struggle with what we would today recognize as depression.
See Boyer, supra note 40, at 3-4, 33-37 (positing a connection between Williston's
psychological maladies and his formalistic, logical approach to contract law). In this account,
formalism appealed to Williston's "need for order," id. at 4, "a deep-seated fear of being out of
control" and "a fear of formlessness." Id. at 36. Though intriguing, this asserted link between
depression and formalism seems ultimately unpersuasive. There surely have been many
depressed law professors other than Williston, both in his time and in ours, and formalism
apparently has not attracted most of them. Besides, as the text demonstrates, Williston's
concern for logic in law is tempered by his strong interest in the practical effect of legal rules.
See infra notes 245-99 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's views on the presumptive
force of legal rules).
228. For example, Omri Ben-Shahar argues that formalism should be justified, not on the
basis of its "aesthetic" claims, "but from its effect on the individuals whose behavior the [legal]
system aims to regulate." Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in
Commercial Law, 66 U. Ct. L. REV. 781, 782 (1999). Williston would quite agree.
229. Cf Williston, Book Review, supra note 38, at 221 (discussing the "high practical value
of logic").
230. See Williston, supra note 37, at 240 ("Law must be reasonable not only in order to be
respected, but to be understood even by lawyers. That means not only that the results reached
shall be just, but that they shall be logical deductions from settled principles.").
231. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 213; see also Samuel Williston, Book Review, 44 HARv.
L. REV. 1005, 1006 (1931) (reviewing ARTHUR B. KEITH, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1931)) ("It is impossible to obtain any grasp of the law except by acquiring capacity to reason
from its fundamental principles.").
232. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 209.
233. Id.
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Second, logic promotes predictability and stability in law, which in turn
promote the security of transactions. "[I]t is common sense," Williston writes,
that "comparative certainty ... as to one's rights and duties can come only from
a recognition of legal principles, and a logical application of them., 234 The
comparative certainty that logic provides allows parties to plan their
transactions more effectively and eliminates much in the way of unnecessary
and costly litigation, an advantage that Williston perceives as "the great triumph
of a system of law., 235 In a legal regime based on logic, he writes approvingly,
"a majority of the people go through life with their rights and duties so clearly
settled by established legal rules that no contest arises over them. ' 236 Of
course, commercial practices may evolve over time, and Williston does not
believe that legal rules should be static. But even as practices evolve, logic can
impart a necessary stability to law, insuring that the rules do not change so
abruptly as to surprise or confuse the regulated parties.2 37
Third, logic makes the legal system more acceptable to the general public.
"Law must be reasonable... in order to be respected," Williston writes. 238 If
citizens see that legal rules follow closely from first principles-that lawyers
cannot sabotage litigation with arbitrary and unpredictable exceptions-they
will more strongly support the legal system. Moreover, logic protects public
liberty by acting as a restraint on the whims of judges. Without logic,
"[j]urisdiction exercised by courts of law, with all traditional forms, may
become as personal as that exercised by a sovereign. 2 39 Such "personal"
jurisdiction would injure social cohesion; the public would come to resent the
idea that it must answer to the idiosyncrasies of other citizens. People prefer
"to be subjected rather to what seems an inanimate rule," Williston writes,
"than to the unbridled will of one of their fellow creatures."
240
"What seems an inanimate rule." Note that for all his emphasis on logic,
Williston recognizes that law ultimately involves more than the mechanical
derivation and application of rules. Williston maintains a fairly active legal
practice throughout his academic career; he knows that the idea that judges
simply announce predetermined results is a "fiction," a "delusive belief."241 A
234. Williston, supra note 37, at 239.
235. WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 2.
236. Williston, supra note 37, at 239.
237. "Unless logic can in the main be trusted, no one can safely advise on the new
problems which are constantly arising." Williston, Book Review, supra note 38, at 221.
238. Williston, supra note 37, at 240.
239. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 214-15.
240. WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 2.
241. Id. at 141.
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lawyer, he writes, quickly learns "that when the equities of a case are strongly
against him, the fact that logical deductions from established rules are in his
favor may not save him from an adverse decision. 2 42 Clever judges can always
find ways to pick and choose among facts and rules in order to reach
satisfactory results in particular cases.243 Williston does not argue that logic
makes law determinate; rather, he argues that logic makes law more
determinate, and that greater determinacy creates important social benefits.244
Moreover, Williston does not believe that courts should apply rules in a
mechanical way. Law is a pragmatic enterprise that must serve social needs. 245
If logical application of a rule leads to seriously undesirable social
consequences, the rule should not be followed. In explaining this belief,
Williston draws a distinction between geometric logic and legal logic, a
distinction that will surprise people who hold the conventional view of him.
246
Geometric logic, Williston writes, is conclusive; its "'arguments aim at
demonstrative certainty.', 247  Legal logic, by contrast, is a matter of
"[p]resumptions and probabilities; 248 it indicates the likely result, at least in the
absence of serious practical difficulties. So, for example, when Realist Walter
Wheeler Cook quips that formal logic is so indeterminate that it cannot even
definitively resolve a dispute whether "Socrates is mortal,"249 Williston
answers:
If we can say, almost all men are mortal, though occasionally one may be
found who is not, the judicial conclusion in a particular case is likely to be
that Socrates is mortal unless it can be shown that there are some peculiar
circumstances in the facts of his case rendering the rule that applies to most
men inapplicable to him. A great deal of legal and judicial reasoning is like
that.250
242. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 215.
243. See id. (noting "the ability of the court to make without contradiction more or less
persuasive arguments for distinctions in fact or law in troublesome cases").
244. See WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 156-57 (describing legal logic as a matter of
probabilities).
245. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 202 (describing law as "a pragmatic science").
246. See WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 157 n.2 (discussing the difference between the
"logic of probabilities" in law and the "logic of certainty" in subjects like geometry) (internal
quotations omitted).
247. Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 68 (1924) (internal
reference omitted)).
248. Id. at 157.
249. Id. at 153-54.
250. Id. at 156-57.
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Thus, like the new formalists, Williston maintains that rules should have
merely presumptive force."' In an appropriate case, logic must take a back seat
to familiar Willistonian concerns about "practical convenience" and rough
justice.252 "No one will dispute," he writes, "that logic should be the servant
not the master of practical convenience, and that where logic and convenience
are clearly at war, logic must yield.0 53 Of course, deciding precisely when
logic and convenience are clearly at war is a matter of judgment, and, as Lon
Fuller trenchantly observed, Williston is "slow to declare logic in distress.,
254
Given the advantages that logic creates for the legal system, Williston believes
that courts should depart from the analytic method only on the strongest
arguments from social policy.255 But in the end, social welfare, not logic,
controls: "[L]aw is made for man, and not man for the law .... ,,2s 6
One can appreciate the role that presumptive rules play in Williston's
jurisprudence by examining his treatment of consideration. As discussed
above, consideration brings out the logician in Williston-never is his writing
more formal and axiomatic. Even in this context, however, Williston
understands that particularly exigent circumstances may require courts to forgo
the straightforward application of rules. Notably, Williston becomes more
flexible about consideration as his career progresses. As time goes by, he
shows a greater willingness to set aside the bargain requirement because of
257pragmatic concerns.
For example, every first-year law student knows Williston's early views on
the revocation of an offer for a unilateral contract. By definition, the
consideration for such an offer is complete performance by the offeree; as a
matter of logic, therefore, the offeror should be able to revoke the offer, without
liability, anytime before the offeree has completely performed. The 1920
contracts treatise adopts this position. Thus, Williston writes, "if A offers one
hundred dollars if B will complete a piece of work, and B sets about the work
251. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing new formalism).
252. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 311. See Williston, Repudiation (Part II), supra note
167, at 438 ("It may be conceded that practical convenience is of more importance than logical
exactness .... ").
253. Williston, Book Review, supra note 38, at 221.
254. Fuller, supra note 94, at 10.
255. See Williston, Repudiation (Part II), supra note 167, at 438 (arguing that
"considerations of practical convenience must be very weighty to justify infringing the
underlying principles of the law of contracts").
256. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 119, at 256.
257. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1453-54, 1460 (1987) (discussing changes in Williston's jurisprudence
over time).
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and nearly finishes it," "A" may nonetheless revoke the offer.258 Williston
concedes that allowing "A" to revoke in these circumstances will cause
"hardship" to "B," and that, "to avoid [this] hardship," some commentators had
argued that one should regard the offer "as containing by implication a
subordinate offer to hold the main offer open for a reasonable time. "
259
Williston applauds the impulse behind this implied-option argument-he
suggests that legislatures should pass a statute making the offer irrevocable in
these circumstances-but he ultimately rejects it as "artificial., 260  Logic
requires that the offeror have the capacity to revoke. "[A]ny other result"
would require "either a violation of recognized principles of contract, or the
invention of new ones.
261
Over time, though, Williston reconsiders his views.262 The Restatement,
on which Williston serves as Reporter, adopts the implied-option argument in
1932,263 and the 1936 edition of the contracts treatise endorses that "advanced
position" as well.26  Williston still regards it as "difficult" to explain "on
theory" why the offeror should not be able to revoke in these circumstances.
265
But recognition of the "great injustice"-no longer simply "hardship"-of
denying relief to an offeree who has begun work in reliance on an offer leads
Williston to accept the need for an exception.266 Rather than rely on "fictitious
interpretation[s]," the Restatement wisely makes a "direct statement" forbidding
revocation.267 Given the offeree's "justifiable reliance," this is one of those
258. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 60, at 100. Students will recognize the classic
classroom hypotheticals involving an offeree who almost makes it to the top of the flagpole or
across the Brooklyn Bridge. See, e.g., K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and
Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 785, 787 n.9 (1939) (discussing the flagpole and bridge
hypotheticals).
259. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 60, at 100, 101.
260. 1 id. at 101-02; see also l id. § 60a, at 102-03 (discussing statutory solution in civil
law).
261. lid.§60, at100.
262. See Farnsworth, supra note 257, at 1451-52, 1453-54 (discussing how Williston's
views evolved over time).
263. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1932).
264. Williston, supra note 50, at 172. The preface to the revised edition of the treatise
makes plain that Williston had "personally examined every section" of the revised work "and
either collaborated in its production or approved its form." I WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra
note 222, at v.
265. 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 222, § 60, at 165.
266. 1 id.
267. Williston, supra note 50, at 172.
246
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particularly exigent circumstances in which real-world consequences trump the
application of a formal rule.
268
Williston's reference to the offeree's "justifiable reliance" suggests
another important example of his willingness to forgo the rigid application of a
rule: His embrace of promissory estoppel. That doctrine, perhaps the most
significant exception to the bargain principle, allows courts to enforce certain
promises, even without consideration, in circumstances where promisors have
induced reasonably foreseeable reliance on the part of promisees. The
conventional story, popularized by Gilmore, holds that Williston reluctantly
agrees to include a promissory estoppel provision in the Restatement only after
his adviser Arthur Corbin embarrasses him by pointing out a number of cases
relying on the doctrine.269 In fact, though, nobody has to shame Williston into
accepting promissory estoppel.27° On the contrary, Williston repeatedly claims
credit for having invented the doctrine and for making it a success. 271 Indeed,
according to Corbin, Williston helps "bludgeon[]" advisers into going along
with promissory estoppel,272 and the records of the ALl discussions on the
268. Id. (stating that an offeree's "justifiable reliance" serves as the "equivalent of
consideration" in these circumstances).
269. See GILMORE, DEATH OF CoNTRACT, supra note 16, at 61-65 (discussing the purported
debate between Corbin and Williston over Section 90); HILLMAN, supra note 92, at 43-44
(describing roles of Corbin and Williston); see also Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement
of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997
Wis. L. REv. 943, 962 (noting that the "Gilmore/Corbin story" has "achieved the status of an
originary myth among contracts scholars"). Gilmore claimed to have heard the story directly
from Corbin, but the endnotes to Death of Contract suggest that Gilmore was exaggerating for
effect. His conversations with Corbin, he writes, "took place twenty years ago and the events
which Professor Corbin was describing had taken place twenty or thirty years before that.
Obviously there is bound to be a certain amount of slippage between what really happened and
this second-hand reconstruction of what happened." GILMORE, DEATHOF CONTRACT, supra note
16, at 128 n. 135. In correspondence with Robert Braucher, Corbin shared credit with Williston
for the success of Section 90. Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to
Robert Braucher Annotated, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 755, 768-69 (1993).
270. See, e.g., James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REv. 547, 566-67 (1995)
(discounting the conventional story and describing Williston's key role in developing the
doctrine of promissory estoppel); Mike Townsend, Cardozo 's Allegheny College Opinion: A
Case Study in Law as an Art, 33 Hous. L. REv. 1103, 1123 & n.120 (1996) (stating that "it
appears that something is left out of the traditional story").
271. So, for example, in a lecture he gives to Cincinnati lawyers in 1933, Williston crows,
"I have invented a name for the basic reason for supporting [reliance cases] ... and I seem to
have made it go at least in one or two States." WILLISTON, supra note 207, at 15; see also
Williston, supra note 50, at 173 n. 15 (suggesting that Williston created the term "promissory
estoppel").
272. Perillo, supra note 269, at 769 (quoting a 1961 letter from Corbin to Braucher).
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Restatement suggest that, more than anyone else, Williston champions the
doctrine against its conservative detractors.273
As in the unilateral contract example, Williston endorses promissory
estoppel only gradually. 274 The 1920 contracts treatise collects several cases
enforcing gratuitous promises that had induced reasonably foreseeable reliance
on the part of promisees. Although one might try to explain these decisions in
terms of estoppel, Williston writes, the cases do not really implicate that
doctrine, since estoppel ordinarily involves some misrepresentation of fact.
2 75
Instead, "the term 'promissory' estoppel or something equivalent should be
used. 2 76 Williston concedes the "intrinsic merit" and "justice" of enforcing
such promises and hints that a doctrine of promissory estoppel could answer
frequent complaints about the "technicalities" of the consideration
requirement.277 He even suggests a historical precedent, noting that "it may
fairly be argued that the fundamental basis of... contracts historically was
action in justifiable reliance on a promise-rather than the more modem notion
of purchase of a promise for a price. 278 Nonetheless, he concludes that a
doctrine of promissory estoppel would "much exten[d] liability on promises"
and that "the great weight of authority" opposed the idea.279
Thus, even before the Restatement project gets underway, Williston is
toying with the idea of promissory estoppel.280 Within a few years, as Reporter
on the Restatement, Williston comes to support the doctrine enthusiastically.
Indeed, he himself drafts the Restatement's version of promissory estoppel, the
famous Section 90: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
273. See Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. APP. 85-114,126 (1926)
[hereinafter ALl Proceedings] (discussing Section 88, the predecessor of Section 90). In the
interests of convenience, I refer to Section 90 by its final section number throughout this
discussion.
274. See Farnsworth, supra note 257, at 1460-61 (discussing Williston's evolving views
on reliance and his eventual endorsement of Restatement Section 90).
275. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 139, at 307-08.
276. 1 id. at 308.
277. lid. at 313.
278. 1 id. Williston mentions this idea again briefly in a commentary prepared for the ALl.
Commentaries on Contracts Restatement No. 2, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 14 (1926) [hereinafter ALl
Commentaries] (prepared by Samuel Williston, Reporter) (discussing old action of assumpsit).
For more on Williston's suggestion of a historical precedent to promissory estoppel, see
Farnsworth, supra note 257, at 1457.
279. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 139, at 313.
280. See Gordley, supra note 270, at 567 (discussing Williston's treatment of promissory
estoppel in his 1920 contracts treatise); Perillo, supra note 269, at 769 n.40 (same).
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binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. '0 2 1
What accounts for Williston's newfound commitment? His commentary on
Section 90, prepared for ALI members, suggests that a few cases decided after
the 1920 treatise had increased his confidence in the courts' willingness to
accept the new doctrine.282 But a few new cases cannot supply the true
explanation for such a radical change.28 a Something else is at work. Williston
comes to believe that pragmatic concerns make an exception to the bargain
requirement necessary in these circumstances: Justice requires holding a
promisor to his promise in circumstances where the promise induces definite
and foreseeable reliance on the part of the promisee.
In defending Section 90 at a meeting of the ALI, Williston makes clear
that consideration can serve only as a presumptive requirement in contract law,
and that there must be some escape when the requirement leads to seriously
284unjust results. For example, he concedes that the language of Section 90,
particularly its reference to "injustice," is somewhat vague.285  But that
vagueness is unavoidable:
Unquestionably, the word "injustice" ... leaves a certain leeway one way
or the other to the judge. As someone expressed it, in regard to this section,
if you bind up too closely, with definite mathematical rules the law of
consideration, the boiler will burst. You have got to leave the court a
certain leeway outside of those mathematical and exact rules. This section
is, so to speak, the safety valve for the subject of consideration. 286
To be sure, if the new doctrine were not entirely to supplant the consideration
requirement, the exception had to remain fairly narrow-hence Williston's
insistence that only foreseeable, "definite and substantial" reliance, not reliance
alone, could make a promise binding.28 7 Still, some "safety valve" was
28 1. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). On Williston's authorship of Section 90,
see Perillo, supra note 269, at 769 & n.40.
282. See ALI Commentaries, supra note 278, at 14-18 (discussing cases); Gordley, supra
note 270, at 567 (discussing Williston's use of case law in defending promissory estoppel).
283. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 821, 854-55 (1997) (arguing that Williston does not endorse Section 90 because it states
existing law but because he approves of its social consequences).
284. See DeLong, supra note 269, at 963 (discussing Williston's views on Section 90).
"Williston seems to have considered Section 90 to be a tool with which courts could achieve ex
post equitable results in cases in which the doctrine of bargain contract would almost, but not
quite, fit...." Id.
285. See ALIProceedings, supra note 273, at 86 (noting that "the meaning [of injustice] is
purposely left somewhat indefinite"); see also id. at 100-0 1, 109 (discussing indefiniteness of
Section 90).
286. Id. at 86.
287. See id. at 90,92-93, & 97 (discussing the need for a narrowed definition of reliance in
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essential, and Section 90 seemed a worthwhile device, even if its precision was
not "mathematical."
Williston's support for promissory estoppel as an exception to the bargain
requirement, along with his recognition of the necessarily vague contours of the
doctrine, shows that he does not endorse rigidity in the application of legal
rules. One aspect of his defense of promissory estoppel does tend to support
the conventional wisdom about Williston, however. During the AlI
discussions, several questioners ask Williston which measure of damages
should be available under promissory estoppel: the expectation measure, which
attempts to place the injured party in the position he would be in had the
promisor kept his promise, or the reliance measure, which attempts to place the
injured party in the position he would be in had the promisor never made the
288promise. The language of Section 90 does not explicitly address the issue.
Somewhat surprisingly, Williston takes the position that the full
expectation measure of damages is the proper remedy. The expectation
measure, Williston explains, is the standard remedy in a contract action; once
you decide to impose liability on a promise, no other measure should be
available.289 Moreover, he argues, the cases that establish the doctrine support
Section 90); ALl Commentaries, supra note 278, at 20 (describing the requirement of "definite
and substantial" reliance); see also Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of
Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 123-27 (1991) (discussing Williston's endorsement of
requirements of foreseeability, definiteness, and substantiality). A debate currently rages over
the relative importance of reliance to promissory estoppel. Compare Daniel A. Farber & John
H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904 (1985) ("[R]eliance is no longer the key to promissory estoppel."), and
Yorio & Thel, supra, at 167 (arguing that reliance is not essential), with DeLong, supra note
269, at 948 (arguing that "[clontemporary courts rigorously enforce" the reliance requirement),
and Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 580-81 (1998) (stating that cases
"underscore the immense importance of reliance").
As I discuss in the text, Williston believes that reliance is necessary but not sufficient to
support an action for promissory estoppel. To use Randy Barnett's phrase, Williston believes
that there must be "reliance plus something." Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Is Reliance Still
Dead?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,2 (2001); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46
J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1996) (discussing how, in the "new consensus" view of promissory
estoppel, "the existence of detrimental reliance alone does not tell you when reliance will be
protected"). For Williston, that "something" is a promise that the promisor should have foreseen
would cause the promisee to rely "in certain definite ways." ALl Proceedings, supra note 273,
at 89.
288. See ALl Proceedings, supra note 273, at 95-96, 98-99, 101-02, 103-04, 110-11
(recording questions posed to Williston regarding the measure of damages due an injured party
under Section 90). For more on the expectation measure, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 107,
§ 12.1, at 756. For more on the reliance measure, see id. at 758.
289. ALl Proceedings, supra note 273, at 103-04.
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the award of expectation, not reliance, damages.2 90 Williston's position comes
through clearly in an oft-quoted exchange with lawyer Frederick Coudert,
concerning a hypothetical case in which an uncle promises $1000 to his
nephew Johnny, knowing that Johnny will use the money to buy a new car:29'
MR. COUDERT: Would you say, Mr. Reporter, in your case of Johnny and
the uncle, the uncle promising the $1000 and Johnny buying the car-say,
he goes out and buys the car for $500-that uncle would be liable for
$1000 or would he be liable for $500?
MR. WILLISTON: If Johnny had done what he was expected to do, or is
acting within the limits of his uncle's expectation, I think the uncle would
be liable for $1000; but not otherwise.
MR. COUDERT: In other words, substantial justice would require that uncle
should be penalized in the sum of $500.
MR. WILLISTON: Why do you say "penalized"?
MR. COUDERT: Because substantial justice there would require, it seems to
me, that Johnny get his money for his car, but should he get his car and
$500 more? I don't see.
MR. WILLISTON: Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is
binding it has to be enforced as it is made .... [I]t seems to me you have
to take one leg or the other. You have either to say the promise is binding
or you have to go on the theory of restoring the status quo.
29 2
Critics at the time and since have condemned Williston's insistence on
expectation damages as excessively conceptual.2 93 Indeed, Williston's rigidity
290. Id. at 99; see also Yorio & Thel, supra note 287, at 122 (discussing Williston's use of
reported cases at ALl proceedings).
291. For discussions of this exchange, see, for example, Yorio & Thel, supra note 287, at
116-17, and HILLMAN, supra note 92, at 45-46.
292. ALI Proceedings, supra note 273, at 98-99, 103-04.
293. Williston's views on remedies under Section 90 occasioned Fuller & Perdue's famous
critique of his conceptualism. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 64-65 (1936) (rejecting Williston's position on
expectation damages under Section 90); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages: 2,46 YALE L.J. 373, 401, 405-06, 413 (1937) (discussing the
measure of recovery under Section 90). For more recent criticism, see Eisenberg, supra note
283, at 834 (stating that, in justifying his position, "Williston fell back on the extreme
conceptualism of which he was occasionally capable").
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in this regard is puzzling, both because it contradicts his general flexibility on
promissory estoppel and because it is inconsistent in spirit with other statements
he makes on the question. In other sections of the ALI discussion, Williston
concedes that a promisee's effective recovery may be limited to the reliance
measure. Section 90, he reminds his listeners, makes a promise binding only if
there is no other way to avoid injustice. If a court can find a way to restore a
promisee to the position he was in before the promisor made the promise, there
will be no injustice; the court should not enforce the promise in those
circumstances.294 This would be the outcome, Williston believes, in "some,'
even "many," promissory estoppel cases.295
For example, suppose the uncle promises $1000, and Johnny buys a car
for $500. What if, perhaps with some pressure from the court, the uncle
subsequently agrees to reimburse Johnny for the $500 or arranges to have the
dealer take back the car and return Johnny's cash? Could Johnny still enforce
the uncle's promise? Williston believes that the answer is no.296 Justice would
not require the enforcement of the uncle's promise in these circumstances;
Johnny has been restored to his original position and should be content.
Although this result is technically consistent with Williston's insistence that
breach of promise, as such, requires the award of expectation damages-the
whole point is that the court does not enforce the uncle's promise, but merely
restores the status quo between the parties 297 -it seems plain that as a practical
matter Johnny has received the reliance measure of damages as a remedy for his
uncle's breach.
It is hard to know what to make of Williston's rigidity with regard to
remedies under Section 90.298 Perhaps, having endorsed a major and
admittedly "vague" exception to the consideration requirement, he cannot bring
himself to jettison yet another fundamental principle of contract law. Perhaps
he views fine distinctions between "enforcing promises" and "restoring the
294. ALI Proceedings, supra note 273, at 91.
295. Id.
296. Id.atlIO-11.
297. See id. at 94 (distinguishing between restoration of the status quo and enforcement of
"the actual promise that is made").
298. The availability of expectation damages in contemporary promissory estoppel actions
is a matter of some debate. Compare Gordley, supra note 270, at 569 (noting studies showing
that "courts ... rarely protect only the promisee's reliance interest"), and Yorio & Thel, supra
note 287, at 130 (arguing that the routine remedy is either specific performance or expectation
damages), with Eisenberg, supra note 283, at 856-57 (disputing Yorio & Thel's claim), and
Hillman, supra note 287, at 580-81 (noting that the data "suggest[s] the willingness of courts to
grant reliance damages to successful litigants").
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status quo" as intellectually elegant.29 In any case, Williston's rigidity on
remedies should not blind us to the larger point of the promissory estoppel
example-Williston's willingness, when circumstances require it, to forgo the
logical application of a rule in favor of practical concerns and rough justice.
C. Doctrinal Reform and Freedom of Contract
Richard Epstein recently has drawn a distinction between two types of
contract scholarship: "contracts small" and "contract large." 3°° "Contracts
small" relates to contract law at the doctrinal level; it focuses on the rules of
contract formation and performance, the everyday "stuff of lawyer's law."
3 1
"Contract large," by contrast, encompasses broader questions of political
theory.302 In particular, it relates to debates about free-market capitalism and
the proper role of the state in regulating private agreements--debates that
Americans typically associate with Lochner v. New York303 and other turn-of-
the-century Supreme Court decisions on "liberty of contract."3 °4 Epstein notes
that commentators tend to link these two types of scholarship. For example,
liberal critics posit an "intimate connection between the formal doctrines" of
classical contract law-the consideration requirement, the objective theory of
interpretation, and so on-and "the political philosophy of laissez-faire."
30 5
The conventional wisdom certainly posits such a connection in Williston's
case. Both with respect to "contracts small" and "contract large," the
conventional wisdom portrays Williston as a reductive reactionary. At the
doctrinal level, Williston supposedly believes that the rules of contract law
must be rigid and unchanging, secure against reforms that seek to adapt the
legal regime to new social realities.30 6 At the political level, Williston allegedly
299. At least one member of Williston's ALl audience thought this distinction was a "trick"
to get out of a bad result, ALl Proceedings, supra note 273, at I 11, and one present-day
commentator apparently agrees. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1, 25 n.77 (1979) (stating that Williston's solution to the problem "seems overly
ingenious").
300. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the
Lens of Laissez-Faire, in The FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 25 (F.H. Buckley ed.,
1999).
301. Id. at 26.
302. Id. at 25-26 (distinguishing between "contract large" and "contracts small").
303. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
304. Id. at 56.
305. Epstein, supra note 300, at 26.
306. See WIECEK, supra note 28, at 93 (describing "Langdellianism" and its impact on
Williston); see also TWTINNG, supra note 5, at 338-39 (discussing Llewellyn's critique of
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joins other classicists in endorsing Lochner's conception of freedom of contract
as a fundamental right that precludes all but the most lenient state regulation.30
7
Along with other classicists, Williston thus has become a target for critics who
see Lochner's insistence on state neutrality as a mask for anti-egalitarian,
probusiness bias.30 8 Classicists like Williston, the critics contend, ignore the
often pronounced power differentials that render suspect the very idea of
private agreements.3°
This conventional account paints a very distorted picture of Williston's
jurisprudence. First, as should be clear by this point, Williston does not oppose
doctrinal reform as a categorical matter; indeed, as demonstrated above, he
champions one of the greatest doctrinal innovations of the twentieth century,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 10 Williston does not believe that contract
law should be static. 3 1 He understands that law is a social enterprise that must
reflect social conditions, and he recognizes that, as social conditions change,
legal rules must change too.312 Indeed, Williston criticizes other classicists,
including Langdell, for failing to acknowledge these facts.
3 1 3
Williston simply maintains that reform should be careful and gradual and
that lawyers should be cautious about overthrowing settled doctrine in the
hopes of establishing a better legal regime.314 Once again, Williston defends
Williston's contract jurisprudence); Flores, supra note 186, at 165-66 (discussing the
'conventional painting of Williston as the enemy of needed modernization").
307. See WIECEK, supra note 28, at 103 (arguing that classical ideology rejected most
public regulation of contracts); id. at 105 (associating Williston with this ideology). Thomas
Grey recently argues that Holmes first made the link between classical formalism and Lochner
and that the link quickly became "canonical." Grey, supra note 28, at 476-77, 494-96.
308. See Grey, supra note 94, at 33 (discussing the political critique of classicism as
probusiness); see also HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 201 ("The emergence of the objective
theory... is another measure of the influence of commercial interests in the shaping of
American law.").
309. See HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 201 (arguing that Williston's formalism "disguise[d]
gross disparities of bargaining power under a facade of neutral and formal rules of contract
law").
310. See supra notes 270-99 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's advocacy of
promissory estoppel).
311. See Flores, supra note 186, at 166 (rejecting "the conventional view" of Williston and
discussing his doctrinal innovations with respect to "risk of loss in sales of land").
312. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (explaining that Williston views law
as a social construct that must be justified in terms of real-world benefits); supra notes 184-85
and accompanying text (explaining that Williston believes that legal rules must evolve with
social norms).
313. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's criticisms of
Langdell).
314. See, e.g., WILLIsTON, supra note 35, at 207-08 (discussing proposed reforms in legal
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his position on pragmatic grounds. Reforms, even beneficial reforms, can
impose costs that reformers tend to miss. For example, longstanding rules can
create expectations on the part of lawyers and their clients about the way
business is conducted. Even if they improve on traditional doctrine, new rules
and terminology can upset these expectations and throw commercial practice
into confusion and uncertainty.315 At the very least, lawyers and their clients
will have to learn the new rules and adjust their behavior. Courts will have to
clarify the inevitable ambiguities that new legal language creates. Depending
on the scope of the reforms in question, these endeavors may entail substantial
time and expense.316
For reasons such as these, Williston tends to favor established rules and
terminology.3?1 7 Unless one can show pretty clearly that a proposed reform will
improve existing law-a showing that he believes he can make with respect to
promissory estoppel-Williston thinks it is "safer" to stick to the "trodden"
path.318 This pragmatic conservatism explains in part Williston's unwillingness
to jettison the consideration requirement.31 9 It also explains the most famous
example of Williston's resistance to reform, his opposition to the Uniform
Commercial Code. Just after the Second World War, the ALl and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws sponsored the
preparation of a comprehensive code to govern commercial transactions in the
United States. 320 The project, with Realist Karl Llewellyn as Chief Reporter,
produced a draft in the spring of 1949, the "heart" of which was Article 2,
dealing with the sale of goods. 32' Article 2 did not simply amend the Uniform
Sales Act that Williston had drafted a half-century before; it totally replaced the
earlier statute. Very little of Williston's language remained; indeed, the UCC's
drafters prided themselves on their innovative approach to sales law.
322
terminology).
315. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, The Word "Equitable" and its Application to the
Assignment of Choses in Action, 31 HARv. L. REv. 822, 822-23 (1918) (arguing that because
"[w]e are addressing a profession steeped in the old words and phrases... we must generally be
content with received terminology").
316. For a contemporary discussion of these issues, see generally Michael P. Van Alstine,
The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789 (2002).
317. See Williston, supra note 315, at 822-23 (discussing his use of the word "equitable").
318. Samuel Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or
Equitable?, 30 HARv. L. REv. 97, 100 (1916).
319. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's defense of
consideration as a doctrine embedded in American law).
320. FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, § 1.9, at 32.
321. Id. at 33 (internal quotations omitted).
322. See id. (discussing the Code's "entirely new approach to the law" of sales).
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Williston hesitates before commenting publicly on the new Code,
worrying that his status as drafter of the prior Act will make his criticisms seem
defensive or self-interested.32 a In the end, though, he comes out against Article
2. In his very last law review article, which he writes in 1950 at the age of
eighty-eight, Williston strongly criticizes the Code's drafters for ignoring the
costs of their "radical[]" reform. 24 Some business practices may have changed
since enactment of the Uniform Sales Act, he concedes, and perhaps the
changes would justify some amendments, but business practices had not
changed so drastically as to justify the Code's complete overhauling of
American sales law. 25 Moreover, even if the "customs of buying and selling"
had changed dramatically, Llewellyn owed it to the legal profession to couch
his new rules in familiar language.326 In the Sales Act, Williston had
assiduously tracked the language of existing commercial law; 327 Llewellyn, by
contrast, had gone out of his way to introduce a wealth of new phrases and
"rules which have never existed anywhere. 3 21 It will take "[y]ears" and
"countless cases" before courts will be able to determine even reasonably
certain boundaries for the Code's new concepts, Williston predicts, 329 and in
the meantime commercial transactions will be thrown into "a chaotic
condition. ,,330
In retrospect, of course, Williston's prophesies of chaos seem silly. Every
American state (except Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction) has adopted Article 2
with only minor variations, and the great commercial dislocations that Williston
323. See TwINING, supra note 5, at 460-61 n.56 (discussing Williston's response to the
Uniform Commercial Code).
324. Williston, Law of Sales, supra note 1, at 565 ("I did not.., imagine a project to
restate or to reform the law so radically as the proposed Code seeks to do.").
325. See id. at 563 (arguing that "in the main, customs of buying and selling have not
changed, and.., the proper remedy for.., changes in business customs is the enactment of
amendments, not wholesale repeal").
326. See id. ("[l]f an entire revision should be attempted, so much of the phraseology of
existing statutes as states undisputed rules should be retained .... ); see also id. at 564-65
(criticizing the Code's use of novel language).
327. See id. at 564 (discussing how the Uniform Sales Act was "identical in most respects"
to the already-existing English Sale of Goods Act).
328. Id. at 565 ("The new Code... proposes many rules which have never existed
anywhere, and often adopts unusual language."); see also TWINING, supra note 5, at 289-90(discussing correspondence between Williston and Llewellyn concerning Llewellyn's use of
new terminology in the Code).
329. Williston, Law ofSales, supra note 1, at 565 (arguing that "[u]ndera statute as long as
the proposed Code ... the determination of countless cases will be necessary to give reasonable
certainty to the law").
330. Id. at 563. For more on Williston's general objections to the Code, see TWINING,
supra note 5, at 287-90.
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envisioned have not come to pass.33' But Williston's skill at prediction is not
the important issue. The key point has to do with the precise nature of
Williston's objections to the Code. Despite his overheated rhetoric-a
reflection, perhaps, of his advancing age-Williston rejects the UCC on
relatively narrow grounds.332 He does not oppose doctrinal reform in principle;
rather, he opposes what he perceives to be unnecessarily sweeping doctrinal
reform that threatens to create more practical problems than it solves.
The conventional wisdom also distorts Williston's views with respect to
"contract large." When it comes to freedom of contract, Williston is hardly an
unthinking reactionary. To be sure, Williston is temperamentally an economic
individualist. In his autobiography, he writes that he formed his political
philosophy on the works of Benjamin Franklin-"the most interesting
American 0 333-and that nineteenth-century apostle of self-reliance, Ralph
Waldo Emerson. 34 Williston values the ideal of individual achievement and
extols the virtues of economic competition.33 5 He greatly distrusts organized
labor-in the 1920 contracts treatise, he suggests that the law should treat
unions as illegal combinations in restraint of trade 36-and he opposes the
centralized bureaucratic machinery of the New Deal.337 Indeed, Williston helps
lead a fight by members of the Harvard faculty against Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, motivated at least in part by a desire to correct
the public impression that law professors wholly supported Roosevelt's larger
338political program.
331. FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, § 1.9, at 32.
332. See Flores, supra note 186, at 217-18 (speculating that Williston's advanced age may
have contributed to his criticisms of the Code).
333. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 323.
334. 1d. at 335.
335. In old age, Williston recalled:
When I was young I tried as hard as possible to beat out the other fellow. If I had
had security, I probably would not have tried so hard. In these United States one
cannot avoid competition.., and one better be as smart as he can. I recognize it is
hard for the person on the losing side of the competition. It's a hard thing of life,
but nevertheless we have to try to achieve the best, and that cannot be done without
competition. It is a race and I believe in the race.
Samuel Williston-1861-1963, 35 N.Y. ST. B. J. 105, 105 (1963).
336. See 3 WILLISTON, supra note 2, §§ 1655-1656, at 2915-19 (discussing trade unions).
337. See, e.g., WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 180 (suggesting his distrust of the labor
movement); id. at 335 (expressing concern about the New Deal).
338. See Kyle Graham, A Moment in The Times: Law Professors and the Court-Packing
Plan, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151, 158 & n.45, 160-61 (2002) (discussing Williston's role in
opposing the Court-packing plan). For more on Williston's association with the conservative
"Pound" wing of the Harvard Law faculty, see KALMAN, supra note 5, at 60.
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But Williston is not doctrinaire about laissez-faire capitalism.339 Indeed,
as one commentator observes, Williston occasionally espouses positions that
are "mildly liberal" in early twentieth-century terms.340  As a pragmatist,
Williston understands that freedom of contract cannot be the only public value
and that the law must strike a balance between party autonomy and other social
concerns like public health and safety. Williston does not think that courts
should attempt to strike this balance, of course. As explained above, Williston
believes that judges should generally stick to established rules; he does not
think they should have discretion to settle broad social questions in the context
of particular cases.34' Yet Williston does not object to legislative attempts to
ameliorate the harshness of the free market. Indeed, as discussed below, he
occasionally drafts such legislation himself.
Williston's thoughts on the matter appear most clearly in a remarkable
piece, Freedom of Contract, that he writes in 1921.342 Given the conventional
wisdom, one might expect Williston to offer a full-throated defense of
libertarianism in contract law. In fact, he devotes much of his time to
debunking the notion of absolute liberty of contract. During the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century, he explains, "metaphysical and political
philosophers"-never a complimentary designation from Williston-had
preached "[a] gospel of freedom" and laissez-faire economics. 343  This
"theorizing" had made a strong impact on American contract law, which had
adopted extremely individualistic doctrines about parties' capacity to make
agreements free from state regulation. 3"
By the twentieth century, however, the "tide" had turned against freedom
of contract, and Williston makes plain that he favors the direction of the
339. See Grey, supra note 28, at 502 (stating that "Williston gave no support to
constitutional liberty of contract") (internal quotations omitted); see also Grey, supra note 94, at
33-35 (discussing the moderation of classicists on political issues).
340. Havighurst, supra note 43, at 354.
341. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's view of ajudge's
proper role).
342. Williston, supra note 45. For more on this article, see Braucher, supra note 12, at 59-
60.
343. Williston, supra note 45, at 366.
344. See id. at 367 (describing the effect of laissez-faire philosophy on the development of
contract law); see also Williston, supra note 168, at 134 (discussing wide scope of freedom of
contract before the twentieth century). Williston argues that libertarian theories had a
pronounced effect on nineteenth-century American contract law for the simple reason that there
was no opposing theory for them to "contend with and dethrone." Williston, supra note 45, at
367. "It was comparatively easy" for nineteenth-centuryjudges to adopt laissez-faire economics
as a theory of contract, "since any inconsistency with earlier notions was not obvious enough to
be disturbing." Id.
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change.345 Experience shows, he writes, "that unlimited freedom of contract,
like unlimited freedom in other directions, does not necessarily lead to public or
individual welfare. 346 Legislatures must balance the legitimate claims of party
autonomy against other social interests like public health and safety. Once
legislatures have done so, courts should stay out of the way. Williston
denounces the Lochner Court's willingness to obstruct "reasonable social
experiment[s] 3 47 and gives a list of salutary laws that might once have
offended notions of liberty of contract, but fortunately do so no longer: rate
regulations for common carriers, statutes providing standard terms in insurance
contracts, limitations on interest rates that creditors may charge "the necessitous
poor, 348 and even minimum wage laws.349
As Freedom of Contract demonstrates, Williston's approach to the
concept is both pragmatic and institutional-pragmatic in its recognition that
freedom of contract must be balanced against other social interests and
institutional in its focus on assigning the balancing to the correct governmental
actor. This approach resonates with at least some of the current law-and-
economics literature on party autonomy, most notably Michael Trebilcock's
work, discussed earlier.350  To be sure, Williston's argument is not as
theoretically rich as Trebilcock's. Unlike Trebilcock, Williston does not offer a
careful comparison of the perspectives of judges and legislators; he does not
explain public regulation in terms of information asymmetries and other market
failures. These terms would have been completely foreign to Williston.
Nonetheless, Williston's approach is close in spirit to Trebilcock's, and the
affinities should make us wary of dismissing Williston's ideas as archaic and
reactionary.
Williston's moderation appears not only in jurisprudential articles like
Freedom of Contract but also in his work as a statutory drafter. No concept so
typifies freedom of contract as caveat emptor, the doctrine that courts will not
intervene to rescue buyers who have not taken reasonable steps to protect
themselves. 351 Given the conventional wisdom, one would expect Williston to
345. See Williston, supra note 45, at 374-75 (discussing situations where unlimited
freedom of contract does not serve the public interest).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 376; see also id. (arguing that the Lochner Court "paid scant respect to the
opinion of the New York legislature that a limitation of working hours in bakeries to ten hours
would promote health, morals and general welfare").
348. Id. at 375.
349. For discussion of these examples and others, see id. at 374-75, 377-78.
350. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing Trebilcock's views on
institutional competence).
351. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Alan M.
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enshrine the doctrine in the statutes he drafts. But Williston's statutory work
demonstrates an uneasiness with caveat emptor. One important example
involves the provision he writes for the Uniform Sales Act on a buyer's
remedies for a seller's breach of warranty.
Suppose that a buyer purchases defective goods from a seller who has
warranted their quality. Established law at the time Williston drafts the Sales
Act provided that the buyer could keep the goods and sue the seller for
damages, measured as the difference in value between the goods as warranted
and the goods as delivered.5 2 If the seller had known about the defects,
established law also gave the buyer the option to rescind the sale, return the
goods, and recover the purchase price.353 But what if the seller had not known
about the defects? The English Sale of Goods Act, which served as Williston's
principal model, 5 4 did not allow the buyer to rescind the contract in those
circumstances. American jurisdictions were divided on the question, 5 though
the weight of authority apparently favored the English rule.35 6
A drafter who favored an unmitigated right to contract easily could have
adopted the English rule for the American statute. But Williston does not adopt
the English rule. Instead, he drafts a provision for the Sales Act that allows
rescission even where the seller's misrepresentation was innocent.3 57 Williston
argues that a buyer's right to rescind in these circumstances creates practical
advantages. For example, allowing rescission for honest as well as fraudulent
misrepresentation saves litigation costs by obviating the need for difficult and
time-consuming inquiries about the seller's state of mind when he gave the
warranty.
358
Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed?-Doubting the Demise of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD.
L. REv. 387, 391-94 (1996).
352. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 608, at 1009.
353. Id. at 1010; see also WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 260-61 (discussing this
hypothetical).
354. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 261 ("1 had followed [the English statute] in most
particulars in drafting the American act."); see also Williston, Law of Sales, supra note 1, at 564
(noting that the Sales Act mostly "followed the English statute both in substance and in the use
of identical words").
355. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 608, at 1011.
356. Samuel Williston, Rescission For Breach of Warranty, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 195, 211
(1904). The fact that the weight of authority supports the English rule does not stymie
Williston, of course. "[T]he really vital question," he writes, "is not whether the courts often or
twelve or fourteen jurisdictions or more or less support the... rule but what is the intrinsic
merit of the rule itself." Id.
357. Unif. Sales Act § 69(1)(d), I U.L.A. 295 (1950).
358. WILLISTON, supra note 77, § 608, at 1010-11.
260
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More importantly, Williston believes that the rescission remedy promotes
commercial good faith. Williston does not feel comfortable leaving parties
entirely to fend for themselves in the marketplace. Whatever the demands of
freedom of contract, the law should step in when one party seeks to take unfair
advantage of the other. Williston explains his reasoning thus:
The remedy of rescission, if allowed at all, is allowed on broad principles
ofjustice. The basis of the remedy is that the buyer has not bought what he
bargained for. The desirability of such a remedy depends purely on the
business customs of a community and on whether it appeals to the natural
sense ofjustice. Do merchants who value their reputation for fair dealing
take back goods which they have untruthfully, though innocently, asserted
possessed particular qualities? Do reasonable buyers who have bought
goods under such circumstances expect the seller to take back the goods
and refund the price[?] These are the essential inquiries, and there can be
little doubt of the answers .... The morality of taking advantage afterward
of false statements innocently made, by insisting on retaining the advantage
of a sale induced thereby, is almost as questionable as that of making
knowingly false statements to bring about the sale.359
In the end, Williston writes, the English rule represents nothing more than "the
principle of caveat emptor. "360 As a result, the English rule "may well be swept
away, as the more obviously barbarous applications of the doctrine have already
been. ,,361
D. Legal Scholarship and Everyday Pragmatism
Thus far, this Article has shown that the conventional wisdom distorts
Williston's work in three significant ways. First, Williston is not an
essentialist. He defends axiomatic jurisprudence in terms of real-world
benefits, not conformity to a "true" conception of contract.362 Second, Williston
does not argue that legal rules are ineluctable. He contends that rules should
have only presumptive force and that courts should depart from logic in
359. Id. at 1010. For another example of this sort of reasoning in Williston's work, see
Williston, supra note 51, at 437 (arguing that defendant should be liable for honest
misrepresentation, as "[ilt should not lie in the mouth of the man who induced [plaintiff's]
reliance to assert that the reliance was negligent").
360. Samuel Williston, Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 16 HARV. L. REv. 465, 475
(1903).
361. Id.
362. See supra Part III.A (explaining Williston's views on the real-world benefits of
axiomatic jurisprudence).
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 207 (2005)
particularly exigent circumstances.3 63 Finally, Williston is not dogmatic about
freedom of contract. He takes a functional approach that stresses the need for
judicial restraint and legislative balancing of public values. a6 Williston's
views thus have some striking affinities to contemporary contract scholarship.
In these aspects of his work, Williston is closer in spirit to the new formalists
than to classicists like Langdell.
But there is one sense in which the conventional account paints an
accurate picture of Williston's jurisprudence. Compared to the new formalists,
Williston's work is dramatically undertheorized. The new formalists rely on
empirical data and sophisticated economic models to support their doctrinal
prescriptions; Williston makes only shorthand references to concerns about
rough justice and "practical convenience. 3 65 The undertheorized character of
Williston's scholarship comes through in some of the examples already
discussed. Consider Williston's common-sense approach to risk ofloss, 366 his
367
more-or-less intuitive concept of stare principiis, his endorsement of the
vague "injustice" language of Section 90,368 and his rejection of caveat emptor
as a violation of roughly defined norms of commercial good faith.369
Another important example involves Williston's approach to contract
interpretation. Along with his views on the bargain requirement, Williston's
objective theory of interpretation is probably the most famous (or infamous)
aspect of his jurisprudence today.37 ° Much contemporary scholarship dismisses
Willistonian interpretation, associating it with a simplistic and pedantic
textualism. 371 It should come as no surprise that Williston's approach is in fact
363. See supra notes 245-99 and accompanying text (discussing role of presumptions in
Williston's jurisprudence).
364. See supra notes 333--61 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's functional
approach to freedom of contract).
365. See, e.g., Williston, supra note 51, at 436 (discussing "practical convenience");
Williston, Repudiation (Part II), supra note 167, at 438 (same). For discussion of the new
formalists, see supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text (discussing risk of loss).
367. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's concept of
stare principiis).
368. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's defense of
Section 90).
369. See supra notes 351-61 and accompanying text (discussing Williston's uneasiness
with caveat emptor).
370. See Perillo, supra note 219, at 472 (noting that Williston "is famous or infamous-
depending on one's point of view-for propagating the objective approach to contract formation
and interpretation").
371. See, e.g., Michael L. Boyer, Contract as Text: Interpretive Overlap in Law and
Literature, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 167, 171-72 (2003) (characterizing Williston's approach
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a great deal more complex than that.17 In the 1920 contracts treatise, Williston
sets forth an intricate interpretive regime, one that combines both subjective
371and objective elements. In defending that regime, though, Williston relies on
the same sort of unadorned, intuitive arguments that characterize the rest of his
work.
For purposes of interpretation, Williston divides contracts into two
categories: informal contracts, both oral and written, and integrated contracts,
in which the parties adopt a writing as "the full and final statement of [their]
agreement." 374 With respect to the first category, Williston argues that the
"standard for interpretation" should be:
[T]he sense in which the party who used the words should reasonably have
apprehended that the other party would understand them. When A offers
his promise for B's and B accepts, A will be bound not only by any
meaning which A knows, but also any meaning which A ought to know that
B will attach to A's words.
3 75
That meaning could turn on the parties' shared subjective understanding.
Notwithstanding the complaints about his relentless objectivism, Williston
believes that, in this context, parties could contract with reference to a "code
peculiar to themselves. 3 76 So, for example, parties could agree privately that
"horse shall mean cow, or that buy shall mean sell," and a court would enforce
the agreement on those terms.377 The fact that reasonable outside observers
would understand the parties' language differently would not change the
outcome.
to the parol evidence rule as a "mechanical conception" involving "[a] blind faith in language");
Mooney, supra note 24, at 1147 & n.77 (stating that classicists like Williston "expressed strong
faith in the objectivity of language, a faith that served as the conceptualist foundation for
premodem interpretive doctrines").
372. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Centered Parol
Evidence Rule, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 269, 296 (2000) (describing Williston's approach as a "fine-
spun matrix" and an "elaborate framework"); Perillo, supra note 219, at 431 (discussing "the
complex architecture of Williston's objective theory of interpretation").
373. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, §§ 601-62. For helpful descriptions of Williston's theory
of interpretation, see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.11,
at 150-53 (4th ed. 1998); Cunningham, supra note 372, at 296-97.
374. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 604, at 1162-63. Williston also places in the second
category the "very unusual" situation "where the parties to [an] oral agreement assent to a
particular form of words as the definite and conclusive statement of their agreement." 2 id.
375. 2id.§605, atll63.
376. 2id. at 1164.
377. 2 id. "To be sure," Williston cautions, "clear proof will be needed in order to
convince a tribunal that such was the agreement of the parties." 2 id.
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With respect to the second category, Williston does advocate an objective
approach.3 71 If the parties adopt a writing as the embodiment of their
agreement, their subjective intent should no longer matter. In those
circumstances, a court should give the parties' language the meaning that an
outside observer would understand, regardless of the parties' shared private
belief.379 Indeed, the parties to an integrated agreement might find themselves
bound to a meaning "different from that which either [one] justifiably attached
to the words.
380
In defending this bifurcated approach to interpretation, Williston draws a
common-sense distinction between informal and integrated contracts. While
the new formalists rely on empirical studies and economic models to explain
their interpretive methodology, Williston goes on an intuitive sense of what
parties must be thinking. In an informal contract, he argues, the parties do not
focus so much on the words they employ to describe their agreement. Their
"minds... are not primarily addressed to the symbols which they are using;
they are considering the things for which the symbols stand. 381  Thus, a
subjective approach, one that turns on the parties' actual understanding, makes
sense in that context. In an integrated agreement, by contrast, the parties do
focus on the words-they "assent[] to the writing as the adequate expression of
the things to which they agree. 38 2 The writing should thus supersede whatever
private understandings the parties may have had; the writing, and not the
parties' subjective intent, should determine the contours of their agreement. 383
Having explained why an objective approach should apply to an integrated
agreement, Williston goes on to define the precise sort of objective standard
that a court should use. For Williston, there are two contenders: the "normal
378. See 2 id. §§ 606-07, at 1164-71 (arguing for an objective standard for integrated
agreements); see also CALAMAI & PERILLO, supra note 373, § 3.11 (a), at 150-51 (describing
Williston's objective standard with respect to integrated agreements).
379. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, §§ 610-11, at 1175-81 (discussing interpretation of
integrated agreements); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 373, § 3.11 (a), at 150-51
(discussing Williston's standard with respect to integrations).
380. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 607, at 1170; see also I id. § 95, at 18 1. Williston notes
that the parties may be able to obtain relief under the equitable doctrine of reformation, another
example of his willingness to forgo the application of a presumptive rule in exigent
circumstances. 2 id. § 606, at 1165; see also 3 id. § 1552, at 2753 (describing reformation as a
"limitation necessary to work justice"); Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of
Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85, 92-93 (1919) (describing the reformation doctrine as matter of
justice).
381. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 606, at 1165.
382. 2 id. (emphasis added).
383. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 373, § 3.11(a), at 151 (discussing this aspect of
Willistonian interpretation).
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standard," that is, the "common and normal sense of' the writing's language, 3 4
and the "local standard," that is, "the natural meaning of the writing to parties
of the kind who contracted at the time and place where the contract was made,
and with such circumstances as surrounded its making. 385 Williston opts for
the local standard, a standard that includes any applicable trade usages.38 6 Once
again, Williston explains his choice in common-sense terms. The "normal"
standard would provide a bit more certainty than the local standard but would
be excessively rigid.387 The local standard, by contrast, provides "a reasonable
degree of certainty" without posing as many traps for careless parties.388
One final aspect of Williston's interpretive method deserves mention.
Much in Willistonian interpretation depends on whether the parties have made
an integrated agreement. That question, in turn, implicates Williston's views
on the application of the parol evidence rule and his famous debate on the
384. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 603, at 1162 (describing the "popular"-normal-
standard).
385. 2 id. § 607, at 1167. Williston borrows these terms from Wigmore. See 2 id. § 603,
at 1162 (discussing Wigmore's definitions of"popular" and "local" standards); see also Rakoff,
supra note 21, at 1284-85 (discussing Williston's debt to Wigmore).
386. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 608, at 1171-72 (stating that "[t]he local standard is
preferable to the normal standard"); see also 2 id. § 603, at 1162 (describing local standard as
"including the special usages of a religious sect, a body of traders, an alien population, or a local
dialect") (internal quotations omitted); 2 id. § 650, at 1258 (citing approvingly cases "where
words with a clear normal meaning have been shown by usage to bear a meaning which nothing
in the context would suggest").
387. 2 id. § 608, at 1171-72.
388. 2 id. at 1171. Williston's endorsement of the local rather than the normal standard
highlights another way in which the conventional wisdom distorts his jurisprudence. Critics
often condemn Williston for supporting a simplistic version of the "plain-meaning rule"-for
arguing that a court should interpret contract language in light of ordinary meaning, without any
investigation of the context in which the parties were working. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 371,
at 17 1-72 (arguing that the Willistonian belief in "plain meaning" represents "[a] blind faith in
language"); Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv.
169, 187-90 (1989) (discussing Llewellyn's disagreement with Williston's plain meaning rule).
But Williston expressly rejects that version of the rule. "Contracts apparently clear in their
meaning," he argues, "may be shown by usage or the surrounding circumstances to be
ambiguous or perhaps clearly to mean something different from the normal or ordinary meaning
of the language." 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 609, at 1173. Williston maintains that evidence
of context and local usage, including trade usage, should "always be admissible" to show the
local meaning of the parties' language. 2 id. § 629, at 1214. Indeed, even evidence of the
parties' negotiating history should be admitted to prove or to clarify ambiguities about local
meaning-though not, of course, to show the parties' unexpressed intent. 2 id. § 630, at 1217-
18.
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subject with Arthur Corbin.389 The debate covers some difficult ground, but we
can focus on Williston's key points.
How should a court determine whether a writing is an integration?
Williston proposes a two-part test. If the writing contains a "merger clause"-a
term expressly providing that the writing constitutes an integration-the clause
should be conclusive.39° If the writing does not contain such a "wise
provision," the court must determine the matter by interpreting the writing in
light of all surrounding circumstances other than prior negotiations and
contemporaneous oral agreements.391  This is the crux of Williston's
disagreement with Corbin; Corbin argued that a court should consider such
extrinsic evidence in deciding whether the parties had made an integrated
agreement. 
392
In defending his position, Williston does not engage in anything like the
intellectual calisthenics that characterize contemporary defenses of a "hard"
parol evidence rule.393 He does not talk about efficiency, the incentives for
parties, or the balance that typical firms would strike between precise
expression and transaction costs. 39 4 Indeed, he gives hardly any explanation at
all. He notes only that allowing courts to consider prior negotiations or
contemporaneous agreements would render the parol evidence rule a mere
presumption. 395 A writing that appeared to be a complete integration would
thus give the parties little security, as one of them could always rebut the
presumption by showing the existence of an oral side agreement-even one
389. For a summary of this debate, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, § 7.3, at 434-35.
390. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 633, at 1226.
391. 2id. at 1227.
392. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, § 7.3, at 435 (describing Corbin's position); Ross
& Tranen, supra note 11, at 202 (describing the Williston-Corbin debate).
393. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533,540-68 (1998) (discussing the
"soft" and "hard" versions of the parol evidence rule); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 590-
91 (same).
394. Cf Posner, supra note 27, at 880 ("The literature now speaks in an economic idiom,
with concepts like transaction cost, risk aversion, default rule, and efficiency substituting for
similar but vaguer notions in the earlier writings."); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 544-50
(outlining the authors' "efficiency theory" of contract law).
395. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 633, at 1226. As discussed earlier, Williston generally
believes that a presumptive rule should be set aside when adhering to the rule would create bad
practical results. See supra notes 245-56 and accompanying text (addressing Williston's views
on presumptive rules). In the case of the parol evidence rule, however, Williston believes that
setting aside the rule would itself create bad practical results. See infra notes 396-97 and
accompanying text (discussing Williston's views on the practicalities of the parol evidence
rule).
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"repugnant to the writing.0 96 As a result, the "practical value" of the parol
evidence rule "would be much impaired.
3 97
Williston's penchant for abbreviated policy arguments-his tendency to
describe the effect of legal rules in intuitive terms-can strike a contemporary
academic reader as unsophisticated, even banal.398 Contemporary scholars are
accustomed to richer accounts, both normative and positive, of legal rules and
their operation.399 Unlike Williston, most scholars today would not think it
sufficient to defend doctrine, or explain its effect in the real world, by making
shorthand references to undefined notions of "justice" and "practical
convenience." Williston's repeated reliance on such vague concepts, his use of
common sense as a method of legal reasoning, makes him seem thoughtless and
unambitious-a failure-for all his success in formulating a lasting doctrinal
system.4 °°
One should not be too quick to dismiss Williston on this basis, however.
Before one can judge a body of scholarship, one needs to understand the
scholar's goals and intended audience. Williston's differ greatly from those of
contemporary scholars. Today, most legal scholars think of themselves as
writing primarily for other academics. Their task, as they perceive it, is to
formulate new accounts of law and law's social impact and to defend those
accounts within the scholarly community.40° Rather than as adjuncts to the bar,
they see themselves principally as members of the broader university world;
indeed, they increasingly attempt to map law in terms of other disciplines, like
economics or political science.40 2 They write in an academic idiom, one that
prizes theoretical novelty and rigor and argumentative subtlety.
Williston understands the enterprise of legal scholarship quite differently.
He does not direct his work primarily toward other law professors-given the
small number of law schools at the time, that would have been a narrow
396. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 633, at 1226.
397. 2 id.
398. Cf Posner, supra note 27, at 831 (arguing that "from a modem perspective" economic
insights of earlier scholars "seem banal").
399. See id. at 879-80 (contrasting contemporary contracts scholarship with earlier work).
400. Cf Posner, supra note 14, at 1316 (discussing the "untheorized" quality of traditional
legal scholarship) (internal quotations omitted).
401. See id. at 1321 (discussing contemporary scholarship at leading law schools); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 1217, 1217 (2002)
(stating that law professors no longer direct their work at practitioners, policymakers, orjudges).
402. See Posner, supra note 14, at 1321-22 (discussing law-and-economics and
contemporary constitutional law scholarship); Sullivan, supra note 401, at 1217 (discussing the
"law-and" phenomenon).
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readership indeed-but toward practicing professionals. 43  As explained
above, Williston believes that his most important task as a scholar consists of
creating a doctrinal system that attorneys and businesspeople can use on an
everyday basis, one that simplifies the law and makes it more
comprehensible.4 °4 Williston sees himself, not so much as a participant in the
academic world, but as a member of the bar.40 5 Late in his career, remembering
his early Harvard colleagues, he gives a description that could apply to himself
as well. Thayer and Ames, he recalls, "did not conceive of themselves as
jurists, but as lawyers.... They felt themselves engaged in a practical
profession, and in the training of young men for that profession. As such, they
were pragmatists.
'
,
40 6
Given his goals and his intended audience, Williston's reliance on
intuitive justifications seems more plausible. Lawyers rely on rough judgments
about fairness and practicality all the time.47 So do their clients: Even if
"business people" do not carefully reason out legal problems, Williston writes,
"they do have an instinct" about their proper resolution. 40 ' Lawyers and their
clients work with law on an operational level, and they typically have little
interest in rich theoretical accounts. 4°9 Particularly in the commercial context,
complex and controversial normative accounts of law can have a negative
payoff. As Richard Posner argues, everyday commerce depends on the ability
of parties to displace debates about "deep issues" that can "disrupt and even
poison commercial relations among strangers.
4 10
Indeed, Williston's scholarship shares some important affinities with what
Posner calls "everyday pragmatism" in law, an approach that rejects abstract
speculation and theoretical subtlety in favor of rough-and-ready solutions to
legal problems.4 1  At first, this may seem a surprising claim. Posner is a
403. See Posner, supra note 14, at 1320 (discussing traditional legal scholarship's
emphasis on writing for the legal profession); see also Sullivan, supra note 401, at 1217
(discussing changes in legal scholarship).
404. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining Williston's views on legal
scholarship).
405. As Richard Posner notes, legal scholars traditionally "identified with the legal
profession rather than with their colleagues in other departments of their university. They even
dressed like lawyers rather than like professors." Posner, supra note 14, at 1315.
406. WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 119.
407. See Posner, supra note 14, at 1319 (noting how "'fairness' and 'justice"' are "terms
that lawyers and judges like to toss around as if they were perfectly intuitive").
408. WILLISTON, supra note 207, at 22.
409. See POSNER, supra note 54, at 11-12 (discussing "everyday" pragmatism).
410. Id. at 12.
411. Id. at 11-12, 49-56 (discussing "everyday" pragmatism).
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resolute antiformalist; the idea that he and Williston could share a common
legal outlook goes against all conventional understanding.412  On closer
analysis, though, one discovers that Williston and Posner agree on some central
jurisprudential claims: the irrelevance of metaphysics, the reliance on
common-sense judgment, and the insistence on real-world feasibility. The two
scholars lie on the same continuum; the differences between them are largely
ones of degree.
To be sure, Williston values the formalist virtues more than Posner does.
Williston does not think that the difference between adjudication and
policymaking is quite so narrow.4 3 He would not agree that a judge should
simply "try to make the decision that is reasonable in the circumstances, all
things considered., 41 4 But recall that Williston "embrace[s] formalism as a
pragmatic strategy., 415 Williston is not an essentialist; he endorses formalism
for what he sees as its significant practical advantages. 6 Moreover, Williston
recognizes that judges must set formal logic aside when faced with particularly
exigent circumstances. 7 Williston and Posner agree that law must be justified,
ultimately, by pragmatic considerations. The difference is that Williston thinks
formalism can promise much more in this regard than Posner thinks it can.
Williston's embrace of everyday pragmatism appears not only in his own
scholarship, but also in his evaluation of others' scholarship. For example, his
distrust of abstract speculation causes him to reject Hohfeldian legal analysis,
widely popular in the American legal academy in the late teens and early
twenties. Largely ignored today, Hohfeldian theory sought to explain law in
terms of certain fundamental concepts, law's "lowest common
denominators., 48 By focusing on these bedrock principles, Hohfeld believed,
412. On Posner's antiformalism, see Cox, supra note 175, at 61; Steven D. Smith, The
Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 424-25 (1990).
413. See POSNER, supra note 54, at 74 (arguing that the "gulf between judges and
politicians is narrower than the official picture of the judiciary would have it").
414. Id. at 73 (internal quotations omitted).
415. "Legal formalism and legal pragmatism are opposites, with the important qualification
that a pragmaticjudge might in some circumstances decide to adopt a formalist rhetoric for his
judicial opinions-might even decide to embrace formalism as a pragmatic strategy rather than
just as a pragmatic rhetoric." Id. at 19.
416. See supra Part I1I.A (discussing practical advantages of formalist derivation of legal
principles); Part 1I.B (discussing relationship between logic and pragmatism in Williston's
jurisprudence).
417. See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of presumptions in Williston's
jurisprudence).
418. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58 (1913) (internal quotations omitted); see TwINING, supra note
5, at 34 (discussing Hohfeld's impact on legal scholarship).
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one could more fully appreciate law's "unity" and "harmony. 4 19 Hohfeld set
out to clarify the confusion that he believed lawyers and judges created by
referring to these principles in ambiguous ways.420 So, for example, Hohfeld
famously argued that the term "rights," as used in legal parlance, actually
referred to at least four distinct concepts: rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities.42z
Williston admires some aspects of Hohfeld's work; for example, he asks
Corbin to keep an eye out for Hohfeldian issues in preparing the
Restatement.422 He concludes, however, that on the whole Hohfeldian analysis
is too contrived to be of practical importance. Philosophers might find the
different uses of the word troublesome, Williston writes, but most lawyers have
a tolerably good instinct for the varying meaning of the word "rights" in legal
analysis.423 Despite Hohfeld's claims of improvement, the new terminology
would only introduce confusion where none existed. Moreover, Williston
argues, it makes little sense to hold lawyers and judges to a pedantic standard of
precision. Law is for the real world, and a jurisprudence that "endeavor[s] for
perfect distinctions" and "contains a large number of unusual words is not
likely to be adopted by those who actually control" the law's development.2 4
"The language of philosophical or scientific jurisprudence can never be the
common speech of lawyers.
425
Williston's everyday pragmatism also comes through in his measured
assessment of the "sociological jurisprudence" of Progressives like Roscoe
Pound.4 26 The Progressives-Williston refers to them as followers of the
419. Hohfeld, supra note 418, at 60.
420. TWINING, supra note 5, at 34.
421. Hohfeld, supra note 418, at 30.
422. TWINING, supra note 5, at 397 n.31.
423. See WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 133-34 (discussing Hohfeld's analysis concerning
the various meanings of the word "rights").
424. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 207. In another article that touches on Hohfeldian
analysis, Williston writes:
We are addressing a profession steeped in the old words and phrases, and all the
sources of our law in judicial decisions and statutes are expressed in them. While,
therefore, new terminology is occasionally unavoidable, and not infrequently
helpful if its equivalence to or difference from older expressions is clearly
indicated, we must generally be content with received terminology, making the
precise sense in which we use it as clear as may be.
Williston, supra note 315, at 822-23.
425. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 207.
426. See id. at 208-09 (discussing differences between classical and "functional"
approaches); see also WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 139-40 (discussing Pound's impact on the
development of law as a "social science[]"). For more on Pound's sociological jurisprudence,
REDISCOVERING WILLISTON
"functional approach" 4 27 -- saw themselves as the law's great pragmatists.
418
They rejected what they called the "mechanical jurisprudence" of classical
formalism, 429 arguing that one must understand law, not as an autonomous set
of axioms, but as a flexible tool for promoting beneficial social ends.430 They
believed that scholars should forgo speculation and focus on "instrumental
problem solving.143 1 They argued, too, for more empirical scholarship-for the
study of "law in action" as opposed to "law in books.,
432
As far as Williston is concerned, he and the functionalists differ only in
degree. The functionalists place a somewhat greater "stress... upon the
practical social or economic effect of deciding a given legal problem in one
way or another," and they care somewhat less about the formulation of general
principles to guide legal analysis.433 But, Williston believes, the functionalists'
vision of law as a mechanism for promoting social welfare is entirely consistent
with his own.4' Moreover, while he shows no inclination to do empirical work
himself, Williston has surprisingly good things to say about law in action.
Williston argues that empirical research, particularly on procedural issues, can
provide "necessary information on which the development of the law may
properly proceed. " 435  He cites, among others, a study that his Harvard
colleagues Frankfurter and Pound had conducted on criminal justice in
Cleveland, and another that the Yale Law School faculty had done on civil
procedure in Connecticut.
436
see, for example, SEBOK, supra note 31, at 33 (describing sociological jurisprudence as
"Pound's... contribution to legal theory"). See generally Roscoe Pound, The Need of a
Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
427. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 208.
428. See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493,497-500
(1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)) (discussing
Progressive jurisprudence).
429. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605,608-09 (1908)
(calling for rejection of "mechanical jurisprudence").
430. See Grey, supra note 428, at 498 (stating that Progressives viewed law "as a means to
an end, a socially embedded and purposive set of activities aimed at satisfying human wants
collectively expressed as public policies").
431. Id.at498.
432. See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12
(1910). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1342(2002)
(discussing Progressive calls for empirical scholarship).
433. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 208.
434. Id. at 208-09.
435. WILLISTON, supra note 36, at 146.
436. Id. at 145.
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Still, Williston thinks that practical problems inherent in empirical
scholarship counsel caution.437 "It is generally impossible to obtain a controlled
experiment of the effect of a legal rule," he writes. 438 "So many factors enter
into the ultimate result that reasonable certainty as to the effect of the rule is
hard to obtain. ' 439 That does not mean that empirical work should cease, only
that scholars should be wary of relying too heavily on studies that are frequently
ambiguous. 440 Fortunately, he believes, some of the practical benefits of
traditional legal analysis do not require scientific confirmation."' Common
sense suggests that, all things being equal, simplicity, predictability, and logical
coherence in law promote social welfare." 2 As a result, Williston argues, the
burden is on the Progressives. Unless empirical work clearly shows that
traditional legal reasoning leads to bad social results, jurisprudence should stick
to standard doctrinal arguments." 3
Finally, one can understand Williston's rejection of Realism in pragmatic
terms. Like the Progressives, the Realists questioned the certitude of formal
rules and emphasized the need for policy arguments in legal reasoning. The
Realists carried these themes much further than the Progressives, however.444
Although the Progressives never wholly abandoned the idea that law must be
organized around broad principles-a fact that Williston notes approvingly-
the Realists ridiculed formalism's concern with conceptual analysis. 445 Much
more than the Progressives, the Realists insisted that abstract logic hid the
reality of law, that legal outcomes depended, not on deductive reasoning, but on
437. Id. at 150-51.
438. Id. at 150.
439. Id.
440. See id. at 151 (stating that "[t]he fact that" empirical "investigations... may prove
barren is no reason why every investigation of fact that shows a chance of profitable results
should not be undertaken").
441. Williston states this proposition as follows:
[A]s to some things investigation is not necessary to prove that they are of social
advantage. The proposition for instance can safely be made that, other things being
equal, simplicity of law is desirable. So also the greater degree of certainty with
which a court's decision on a given state of facts can be predicted, the better it is
for society, other things being equal.
Id. at 151.
442. Id. at 151-52, 151 n.7.
443. Id. at 151-52.
444. See Grey, supra note 428, at 500-02 (discussing Realist jurisprudence).
445. See WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 208-09 (discussing the functional approach); Grey,
supra note 428, at 500-01 (discussing Realist jurisprudence).
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"narrow type situations" that one could not organize into predictable doctrinal
446
categories.
Williston's negative reaction to Realism results at least in part from
generational and temperamental differences. The bombastic and self-
congratulatory tone of some Realist scholarship grates on him." 7 For example,
Williston writes in his autobiography, the Realists claim as central tenets of
their creed the ideas that legal doctrines are "in flux," that judges create "new
law," that law must be "a means to social ends," and that scholars must be
prepared to re-examine the purposes and effects of rules.44 These are hardly
novel insights, he notes; others had them before.4 4 9 He takes issue with the
notion that the Realists have discovered that law has a necessary relationship
with justice. "Consideration of the justice of existing rules of law was not
wholly disregarded by teachers of a former generation," he insists.450 "[B]rave
men lived before Agamemnon.
45
Moreover, Williston argues, the Realists' "frenzy" has led them to make
the very error that they charge against the formalists-the Realists
overgeneralize.45 2 Although at any given time some legal doctrines are in a
state of "flux," not all doctrines are unstable. "[T]he every-day law of real and
personal property, of contracts, and of torts" is not so fluid as to prevent parties
from planning their affairs with reasonable certainty.45 3 Similarly, while
"[s]ome judges.., decide cases first and find the best available reasons
afterwards," it does not follow that all judges do so. 454 Not every case presents
an opportunity for this sort of behavior, and anyways, not all judges would be
willing to cheat. Finally, even if deductive logic does not completely explain
many legal decisions, it does not follow that lawyers should simply cast logic
446. Grey, supra note 428, at 500.
447. Llewellyn's exaggerated rhetoric must have particularly irritated Williston. One can
hardly imagine a style more different from Williston's own dry, measured exposition. Compare
I WILLISTON, supra note 2, §§ 22-98, at 25-187 (discussing offer and acceptance) with
Llewellyn, supra note 258, at 782-83 (same).
448. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 210-11.
449. See id. at 211 ("Professor Llewellyn admits that none of these points are wholly
new .. .").
450. Williston, supra note 148, at 972. "[T]hough it was rather the effect on individuals
than on society to which attention was directed, it may be said of most rules of law that the rule
that is just with reference to the individuals concerned, is also that which is most desirable for
society as a whole." Id.
451. Id.
452. WILLISTON, supra note 35, at 211.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 212.
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aside.4 5  Legal logic is always a matter of probabilities; even imperfect
doctrinal coherence serves a vital role in promoting the predictability and
fairness of the legal system. 56
In short, Williston believes that the Realists lack balance and perspective.
The Realists spoil whatever valid points they make about law-and Williston
concedes that the Realists make some-by carrying them too far. 7 Williston's
rejection of Realism thus comports with his overall conception of legal
scholarship as a pragmatic endeavor.58 In their exaggerated diagnosis of crisis
and their inflated claims about the possibility of reform, he believes, the
Realists ignore the central pragmatic virtues of moderation and reasonableness.
Ironically, despite their intent to make law conform more closely to facts on the
ground, the Realists create ajurisprudence too extreme and impractical to be of
use in the everyday world.
IV. Conclusion
Several years ago, Thomas Grey suggested a model of legal history as the
history of philosophy.459 In that model, the legal historian does not focus so
much on the development of legal doctrine or the ways in which legal thought
relates to larger social and political themes. Rather, the historian seeks to
explain how a body of jurisprudence "[was] experienced by those legal
intellectuals who [found] it appealing. ''460 To do this, the historian tries to
fashion a true account of the jurisprudence-an account the intellectuals
themselves would have endorsed-and to explain it in a contemporary idiom. 461
455. See id. at 213-14 (discussing benefits of logical coherence in law, even though "cases
are not always decided in accordance with logical deductions").
456. See id. at 213 ("Many illustrations could be given where broader syntheses have not
only made the law simpler, more reasonable, more scientific, and easier to learn and to apply,
but also more just.").
457. Id. (stating that he would only "make a direct frontal attack" on one Realist claim,
namely, "the belief in the desirability of grouping legal situations in narrower categories than
has been customary").
458. See supra notes 403-17 and accompanying text (discussing pragmatic character of
Williston's scholarship).
459. Grey, supra note 428, at 511.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 511. As Grey states:
One must step out of the historian's external and explanatory mindset, and
approach the theory not as an object of study but as a body of ideas offered for
acceptance. This means formulating it in its most attractive light, at least for a
present reader who is willing to make some effort to enter imaginatively into the
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The historian tries to imagine how legal intellectuals of past generations would
present their arguments to audiences today-how they would justify their
positions and answer criticisms. 462 The historian who pursues this model
becomes, in Grey's words, "the translator for our time of Langdell, or Roscoe
Pound, or Jerome Frank, or Lon Fuller.,
463
Or Samuel Williston. This Article has pursued, with respect to Williston,
the model that Grey suggests. It has tried to take Williston on his own terms, to
understand what he found appealing about formalism in contract law and to
present his scholarship in an unbiased way. It has attempted to restore a more
balanced and correct version of his jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that has had
tremendous impact on the course of American law. Taken as a whole,
Williston's work has more balance and nuance, and shows more continuity
with contemporary contracts scholarship, than we commonly suppose.
theory's original historical context.
Id.
462. See id. ("In this mode, the author... tries to speak for the Classicist, or the Realist,
and invites questions from the reader.., along the lines of 'How would you deal with this
problem?' or 'How can you defend against this objection?"').
463. Id. at512.
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